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Analyst Reputation, Communication and Information Acquisition
Xiaojing Meng
Strategic information transmission models, also called cheap talk models, have become
increasingly popular in accounting, as they have successfully brought new insights to vari-
ous accounting topics. This dissertation consists of two chapters, each analyzes a model of
strategic information transmission between an expert and a decision maker.
In the first chapter, I study how reputational concerns affect analysts’ incentives to
invest in information acquisition, and subsequently, their strategic communication with in-
vestors in form of “repeated cheap talk”. In a setting where analysts’ incentives may be
misaligned with the investors in a particular fashion (i.e. biased towards issuing optimistic
reports), an equilibrium exists in which only aligned analysts will acquire information. As
a result, investors may favorably update their beliefs about the analysts’ type (as being
aligned) when the report is consistent with the realized state. Hence reputational concerns
serve as a disciplining device to curb analysts opportunistic behavior, consistent with eco-
nomic intuition. This is in sharp contrast to earlier studies that have treated information as
exogenous and identical, in which case reputational concerns may work against informative
communication.
The second chapter is based on joint work with Tim Baldenius and Nahum Melumad. In
this work, we study the optimal board composition—of monitoring and advisory “types”—
within a framework of strategic communication between the CEO and the board when the
CEO is an empire builder. The board of directors performs the dual role of monitoring and
advising the firm’s management. At times, it makes certain key decisions itself. A major
concern regarding the effectiveness of boards is CEO power, in particular as it relates to
the board nomination process and CEO entrenchment. Monitoring types on the board aim
to uncover information known to the CEO, whereas advisors aim to uncover incrementally
decision-relevant information. Successful board monitoring allows for selective interven-
tion even if authority is formally delegated to the CEO. Counter to conventional wisdom,
we show that powerful CEOs, who influence the board nomination process, may in fact
prefer more monitors on the board than do shareholders. Regulatory interventions (such as
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) that attempt to strengthen the monitoring role of boards may thus
be harmful in precisely those cases where agency problems are severe. Lastly, to prevent
that CEOs entrench themselves by choosing “complex” projects, shareholders may want to
commit to an advisor-heavy board.
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Financial analysts add value in the capital market by providing information to investors.
One of the stylized facts emerging from the extant literature is that analysts’ reports are on
average optimistic. Many studies have proposed an incentive-based explanation for ana-
lyst optimism. Conventional wisdom and many academic papers (e.g., Fang and Yasuda
(2005), Jackson (2005)) suggest that analysts’ reputational (future) concerns may be an
effective mechanism to curb opportunism. However, recent economic studies (e.g., Holm-
strom (1999), Morris (2001), Ely and Valimaki (2003)) have demonstrated that reputational
concerns may have negative effects in that they sometimes lead agents to make inefficient
2decisions or ignore valuable information. For example, using an expert and decision-maker
model, Morris (2001) derives that reputational concerns may reduce the informativeness of
communication, in that no information is conveyed in equilibrium if aligned experts are
sufficiently concerned about their future. In this paper, I reexamine the effect of reputa-
tional concerns and find that analysts’ reputational concerns may indeed be an effective
way to encourage truthful reporting, once I endogenize the analysts’ information acquisi-
tion decisions.
To model the reputation formation process, I build on Morris (2001) and consider a
repeated cheap talk game with two communication periods, preceded by an information
acquisition stage. In each period, the investor makes an investment decision based on in-
formation strategically communicated by the analyst. The investor is uncertain about the
analyst’s type. An aligned analyst always wants the investor to make the correct invest-
ment decision. A misaligned analyst, in contrast, always prefers a higher investment level
due to such factors as underwriting considerations, trading commission incentives, or pres-
sure from clients or covered firms.1 Each analyst is endowed with some noisy private
1For underwriting considerations, see Dugar and Nathan (1995), Lin and McNichols (1998), Michaely
and Womack (1999), Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (2000), and Hong and Kubik (2003). For trading com-
mission incentives, see Irvine (2004), Jackson (2005), Cowen, Groysberg and Healy (2006). Jackson (2005)
empirically documents that optimistic analysts generate higher trading volume. Cowen, Groysberg and Healy
(2006) conclude that “analyst optimism is at least partially driven by trading incentives”. Although clients
are not obligated to deal through the broker whose analyst provided the research triggering the trading de-
cision, they often do allocate more trade through this broker in order to maintain a good relationship with
the analyst. Due to the institutional restrictions and costs associated with short-selling (D’Avolio (2002)),
positive reports are more effective in generating trading than negative reports. Mola and Guidolin (2009)
look at pressure from clients and empirically document that sell-side analysts are likely to assign frequent
and favorable ratings to a stock after the analysts’ affiliated mutual funds invest in that stock. For pressure
from covered firms, see Francis and Philbrick (1993), Das, Levine and Sivaramakrishnan (1998), Lim (2001),
Lambert and Sapsford (2001), and Solomon and Frank (2003).
3information about the true state of the world. At the outset, the analyst may engage in (un-
observable) costly information acquisition to increase the precision of her signal for both
periods. At the end of the first period, the investor updates his belief about the analyst’s
type based on the analyst’s first period report and the realized state. This updated belief
about the analyst’s type is labeled “analyst reputation”. The second period then unfolds
similarly to the first period, with a new state of the world.
To demonstrate the main result, it is useful to first examine the communication game
in the second period. Since this is the last period, analysts do not care about maintaining
their reputation. Consequently, the aligned analyst will report truthfully and the misaligned
analyst will issue a high report independent of her signal. Hence if the investor receives a
low report, he learns with certainty that the analyst is aligned. If the investor receives a high
report, analyst reputation (formed in the first period) matters in that the greater the assessed
likelihood that the analyst is aligned, the more seriously the investor will take the analyst’s
report and invest accordingly. As a result, both analysts benefit from a high reputation. In
addition, since the misaligned analyst is more likely to exploit her reputation (because she
always issues a high report in the second period), she benefits more from a high reputation
than does the aligned analyst.
Now consider the analysts’ incentives to acquire information. Note that, loosely speak-
ing, analysts benefit from better information through two channels. First, better informa-
tion increases the analysts’ ability to build reputation. Recall that the misaligned analyst
benefits from a high reputation even more than does the aligned analyst. Second, better
4information enables analysts to guide investors toward more profitable decisions, holding
reputation constant. Since the aligned analyst internalizes the investors’ preferences, this
increases the aligned analyst’s payoff. In contrast, precision per se does not matter to the
misaligned analyst because her payoff is independent of the state. Combining these two
arguments, it is not clear, a priori, which type of analyst benefits more from greater pre-
cision. My main result shows that overall, the aligned analyst has a stronger incentive to
acquire information. Hence, if information-gathering costs are moderate, only the aligned
analyst will acquire information and as a result, analyst’s repuational concerns may become
an effective way to encourage truthful reporting.
The above endogenous link between analysts’ levels of misalignment and their pre-
cision reconciles this study with Morris (2001). In the latter, analysts’ precision is exoge-
nously given and identical. Therefore there is only one way for the aligned analyst to signal
her type; that is, to issue a low report, because the misaligned analyst is known to have an
upward bias. As a result, the aligned analyst with high future concerns will tend to issue
low reports independent of her signals, which makes communication uninformative. How-
ever, if, on the other hand, on the equilibrium path the aligned analyst has higher precision
than does the misaligned analyst, then informative (first period) communication may resur-
face. The reason is that now there are two possible ways to build reputation: (1) by issuing
a report as accurately as possible; and (2) by issuing a low report. When the misaligned
analyst’s reputational concerns are sufficiently high, the first mechanism emerges in equi-
librium, so that both types of analysts have reputational incentives to report truthfully. That
5is, the detrimental role of reputational concerns, documented in Morris (2001), disappears;
instead, reputational concerns serve as an effective disciplining device to curb opportunistic
analyst behavior.
If analysts’ information-gathering costs are sufficiently small and the analyst’s future
concerns are sufficiently important, again only the aligned analyst will acquire informa-
tion, but now first period communication becomes uninformative. The reason is as follows:
For sufficiently small information-gathering costs, the aligned analyst is always better off
acquiring information (because she wants the investor to make profitable decisions). At
the same time, the misaligned analyst has no incentive to acquire information because the
benefit of doing so is zero. To see this, note that if both types of analysts acquire informa-
tion, then in any first period informative communication, the misaligned analyst must have
positive probability to issue a high report, no matter what her signal is. Therefore, the mis-
aligned analyst’s utility at the information acquisition stage can be calculated by assuming
that she always issues a high report. Thus acquiring higher precision brings no benefit to the
misaligned analyst. Given that only the aligned analyst acquires information, first period
communication has to be uninformative, because otherwise the misaligned analyst would
also choose to acquire information for reputation building purposes. This result leads to
the somewhat counterintuitive finding that a decrease in analysts’ information-gathering
costs may locally reduce social welfare because of its detrimental effect on information
transmission.
Related Literature. Pioneered by Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts
6(1982), and extended in Fudenberg and Levine (1989), the “reputation effect” literature
confirms the conventional wisdom that reputation effect is good in the sense that it en-
hances the players’ commitment power and therefore increases the players’ long-run pay-
offs. However, some recent studies highlight the negative effect of reputational concerns.
Specifically, Ely and Valimaki (2003) present an example in which a long-run mechanic
needs to perform the necessary repairs to get the short-run motorists’ participation; how-
ever, performing a big repair whenever it is necessary prompts the risk of being interpreted
as a bad mechanic who always performs big repairs. Therefore, if the long-run mechanic
sufficiently cares about his reputation, he may choose not to perform the big repair even
when it is necessary, which makes the short-run motorists unwilling to participate. Ely,
Fudenberg and Levine (2008) extend the above idea and characterize a class of games in
which the bad reputation effect exists. Through rather different mechanisms, Scharfstein
and Stein (1990), Prendergast and Stole (1996), and Holmstrom (1999) also show that a
reputational incentive may lead to information loss or inefficient decisions.
The effect of reputation is also studied in the cheap talk literature initiated by Crawford
and Sobel (1982). Focusing on reputation dynamics, Sobel (1985), Benabou and Laroque
(1992), Kim (1996), Stocken (2000), Morris (2001) and Wang (2009) study repeated cheap
talk games and examine how reputational concerns affect communication. Specifically, in
Sobel (1985) and Benabou and Laroque (1992), the good expert is non-strategic, therefore
reputational concerns encourage the bad expert (with the opposite interest of the decision
maker) to truthfully report her information and hence have positive effect. Morris (2001)
7endogenizes the aligned expert’s strategic behavior and examines the possible negative ef-
fect of reputation. To be specific, he shows that if the misaligned expert has strong tendency
to issue certain message, then the aligned expert may have an incentive to avoid sending
this particular message in order to build reputation, which he refers as “political correct-
ness”. In those papers, the expert’s precision is exogenously given. My paper builds on
Morris (2001) and further endogenizes the expert’s precision. As a result, Morris’ “politi-
cal correctness” result may be overturned and the positive effect of reputational concerns
may be restored.2
Suurmond, Swank and Visser (2004) and Xu (2011) also try to restore the positive effect
of reputational concerns by allowing the agents to acquire information. They demonstrate
that reputational concerns may motivate the agent to acquire better information, which is
socially beneficial. My paper is closely related to Xu (2011). The main difference is that
in Xu (2011) the misaligned expert does not have reputational concerns and therefore his
reporting decision is straightforward, which is he always issuing the particular message
consistent with his current incentives. As a result of that, the aligned expert again has
reputational incentives to avoid sending this particular message, and Morris’ “political cor-
rectness” result still holds. In other words, in Xu (2011), reputational concerns still have
a negative effect on communication, although overall, they have a positive effect on social
welfare through the influence on information acquisition. In contrast, the focus of my paper
2There is another (lesser) difference in the modeling: the misaligned analyst’s payoff takes the form of a
quadratic loss function in my paper, while Morris (2001) deals with a linear payoff function for the misaligned
analyst. Because I endogenize the analysts’ precision choices, the payoff structure of the misaligned analyst
should be comparable with that of the aligned analyst.
8is the potential positive effect of reputational concerns on communication when both types
of experts care about future and hence face non-trivial reporting decisions.
The effect of reputation on analysts’ communication behavior in a static model is the fo-
cus of Trueman (1994) and Jackson (2005). Trueman (1994) finds that analysts, in order to
enhance investors’ assessments of their forecasting abilities, tend to release forecasts closer
to prior expectations than is warranted given their private information, and analysts with
less ability are more likely to herd. Jackson (2005) examines how analysts trade off short-
term incentives to generate more trade against long-term gains from building reputation. In
both papers, analysts’ reputation (type) is with regard to their precision (ability), which is
exogenously given, whereas in this paper, I allow analysts to choose the precision of their
information, and analysts’ reputation (type) is with regard to their levels of misalignment.
In addition, the reputation benefit function is exogenous in the static models.
Prior research has studied analysts’ communication and information acquisition behav-
ior without reputational concerns. Morgan and Stocken (2003) study information transmis-
sion between analysts and investors when investors are uncertain about analysts’ incentives
and analysts’ information sets are exogenous.3 Hayes (1998) examines how incentives to
generate commissions affect analysts’ information acquisition decisions, but assumes that
analysts report truthfully. Fischer and Stocken (2010) endogenize both analysts’ infor-
3Beyer and Guttman (2007) study the interaction between the analyst and the investor in a signalling
model. In their model, reputational concerns constitute part of analysts’ misreporting costs.
9mation acquisition and their reporting behavior. They investigate how public information
affects analysts’ information acquisition decisions and their communication with investors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 lays out the model.
Section 1.3 studies the communication game in each period for exogenous and commonly
known analysts’ precision. Section 1.4 fully characterizes the equilibrium of the model
where analysts’ precision choices are endogenous and unobservable. Section 1.5 discusses
the welfare consequences of changes in information-gathering costs. Section 1.6 presents
the empirical implications and Section 1.7 concludes. All proofs are contained in the Ap-
pendix.
1.2 Model Setup
In this section, I describe the basic setup of the model, which follows Morris (2001). I
consider an investor (“he”) who is uninformed about the state of the world and makes
decisions based on the advice provided by an analyst (“she”). With probability λ, the
analyst’s preference is aligned with the investor (A); that is, she wants the investor to make
correct investment decision in each period. With probability 1−λ, the analyst is misaligned
(M ) and always wants the investor to make “buy” decisions (independent of the state of the
world). The investor is uncertain about the analyst’s type J ∈ {A,M} and only knows the
prior probability of the analyst being aligned (λ).
The game has one information acquisition stage and two communication periods. At
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stage 0, the analyst may choose to exert unobservable effort c to increase the precision
of her signal for the following two periods. In period 1, the state of the world w1 can
take the value of 0 or 1; each state occurs with equal probability. The analyst observes
an informative signal s1 ∈ {0, 1} about the state of the world, and the default precision is
γL : Pr(s1 = w1|w1) = γL ∈ (1/2, 1). If the analyst acquires information at stage 0,
she will increase her precision to γH ∈ (1/2, 1) > γL in the subsequent two periods. After
observing the signal, the analyst issues a report m1 ∈ {0, 1}. The investor then makes an
investment decision a1 ∈ R according to his inference about the state based on the analyst’s
report m1. After the action a1 is taken, the state of the world w1 is publicly observed. Then
the investor updates his belief about the analyst’s type based on the realized state w1 and
the received report m1. As a result, the analyst now has reputation λ2 = Λ(m1, w1) (to be
specified below) entering period 2. Period 2 then unfolds similarly to period 1, with a new
and independent state w2 (again equally likely to be 0 or 1), a new signal s2, a new report
m2 sent by the analyst, and a new action a2 taken by the investor.
The sequence of events is as follows:
In each period, the investor aims to adjust his investment decision at to the state of the
world wt. His utility in each period, t, is given by a quadratic loss function
−(at − wt)2.



















aligned analyst is given by
−xA(a1 − w1)2 − (1− xA)(a2 − w2)2 − C(γA).
The misaligned analyst, in contrast, always wants the high action to be chosen, independent
of the state. Her utility is given by
−xM(a1 − 1)2 − (1− xM)(a2 − 1)2 − C(γM),
where 0 < xJ < 1 captures the weight type J analyst puts on period 1 utility and 1 − xJ
is the weight on period 2 utility. I sometimes refer to 1/xJ as the exogenous future (repu-
tational) concerns. C(·) represents each analyst’s disutility of acquiring certain precision,
with C(γL) = 0 and C(γH) = c. Note that the cost of acquiring information is assumed to
be independent of the analyst’s type.
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An equilibrium in this game is characterized by the analyst’s information acquisition
strategy at stage 0, the analyst’s communication strategy in each period, the decision rule
for the investor in each period, and the belief function of the investor. The type J analyst’s
information acquisition strategy specifies the precision she will choose at stage 0; I denote
it by γJ ∈ {γL, γH}. The type J analyst’s communication strategy in period t is a function
σJt : {0, 1} × {γL, γH}3 → [0, 1], where σJt (st, γJ |γ˜) is the probability of the type J
analyst reporting 1 in period t when her signal is st and her precision is γJ while the
investor’s conjecture of the analysts’ precision is γ˜ ≡ (γ˜A, γ˜M).4 The investor’s decision
rule in period t is a function at : {0, 1} × [0, 1] × {γL, γH}2 → R, where at(mt, λt, γ˜)
is the investor’s action in period t when he receives message mt, his belief of the analyst
being aligned is λt and his conjecture of the analyst’s precision is γ˜. As is implied by the
notation, I only consider pure strategies for the analyst’s information acquisition decision;
however I do allow the analyst to play mixed communication strategies.
Let φJt (mt|wt) denote the investor’s conjecture about the probability of the type J ana-
lyst sending message mt given state wt in period t:5
φJt (1|wt) = γ˜J σ˜Jt (wt, γ˜J |γ˜) + (1− γ˜J)σ˜Jt (1− wt, γ˜J |γ˜),
and φJt (0|wt) = 1− φJt (1|wt). The belief function Γt(mt, λt, γ˜) states the investor’s infer-
4Strictly speaking, the analyst’s communication strategy should depend on her conjecture about the in-
vestor’s action. However, the analyst will infer that the investor’s action depends on his conjecture about the
analyst’s precision, γ˜ ≡ (γ˜A, γ˜M ). Hence, I write out γ˜ instead of a˜t(·).
5I adopt the standard notation in the literature where ·˜ represents the conjecture.
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ence of the actual state being 1 in period t. By Bayes rule, it is given by
Γt(mt, λt, γ˜) =
λtφ
A
t (mt|1) + (1− λt)φMt (mt|1)
λtφAt (mt|1) + (1− λt)φMt (mt|1) + λtφAt (mt|0) + (1− λt)φMt (mt|0)
.(1.1)
Γt(mt, λt, γ˜) is well defined when the denominator is nonzero. I adopt the convention that
Γt(mt, λt, γ˜) = 1/2, the prior, if the denominator is zero. That is, when the posterior
belief of the state is undefined according to Bayes rule, the investor keeps his prior belief
about the state. At the end of period 1, the investor updates his belief about the analyst’s
type. In particular, λ1 = λ is the prior reputation, and λ2 = Λ(m1, w1|γ˜) denotes the
posterior reputation, defined as the investor’s belief of the analyst being aligned if report
m1 is received and state w1 is realized:
Λ(m1, w1|γ˜) = λφ
A
1 (m1|w1)
λφA1 (m1|w1) + (1− λ)φM1 (m1|w1)
. (1.2)
Again, I adopt the convention that Λ(m1, w1|γ˜) = λ, the prior, if the denominator is zero.
At this point, I am in a position to define the equilibrium of the game.6





, σAt (·), σMt (·), at(·),Γt(·),Λ(·)) satisfying the following properties:
6When I define the equilibrium here, I suppress the functional dependence of the players’ strategies and
belief functions on γ˜ = (γ˜A, γ˜M ). Such conjecture will be borne out in equilibrium. The formal definition
of the equilibrium is relegated to the Appendix.
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(I) The communication strategy of the type J analyst in period t, σJt (st, γ
J∗), maximizes
her utility in period t given at(mt, λt).
(II) The investor’s action in period t, at(mt, λt), is optimal given the state inference
function Γt(mt, λt).
(III) The information acquisition strategy of the type J analyst, γJ
∗
, maximizes her
utility at the information acquisition stage.
(IV) The state and type inference functions, Γ1(m1, λ), Γ2(m2,Λ) and Λ(m1, w1), are
derived from the analyst’s equilibrium strategy according to inference rules (1.1) and (1.2).
To facilitate the following arguments, I formally define “informative” communication
in period t:




and Λ(1, 1) = Λ(0, 1) = Λ(1, 0) = Λ(0, 0) = λ.
(2) Communication in period 2 is babbling if Γ2(0, λ2) = Γ2(1, λ2) = 12 .
(3) Communication in period t is “informative” if and only if it is not babbling.
Communication in the first period may be informative in terms of either the analyst’s
type or the underlying state, whereas the only relevant dimension of informativeness in the
second period is with regard to the underlying state. In the following, I refer to an equi-
librium in which communication in each period is babbling as a babbling equilibrium, and
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an equilibrium in which communication in either period is informative as an informative
equilibrium.
Extending standard arguments from the cheap talk literature in which babbling equilib-
ria always exist, in my model there always exists an equilibrium in which neither analyst
acquires information and communication in each period is babbling. Suppose that in each
period the analyst issues report randomly, independent of her type and signal. Then the
investor will rationally make his investment decision solely based on his prior knowledge
of the state. Given such response of the investor, the analyst has incentive neither to deviate
from her uninformative report, nor to become better informed. Therefore, a babbling equi-
librium always exists and neither analyst will acquire information. The interesting question
is whether and when there exist informative equilibria and which, if any, type of analyst
chooses to acquire information. In the following analysis, without loss of generality, I
assume at(1, λt, γ˜) ≥ at(0, λt, γ˜).
Before proceeding, I discuss some of the key features of the model. First, the model
captures the information asymmetry between the investor and the analyst about the lat-
ter’s preference. The prior literature has agreed that little is known about analysts’ prefer-
ences. Different analysts may have different preferences due to their respective compen-
sation contracts, different effectiveness of the “Chinese wall” between investment banking
and research groups of their respective employers, or their different levels of integrity, etc.
However, the investor has little knowledge of those attributes and can only try to infer the
analysts’ types through their track record. Secondly, in the model, two dimensions in which
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analysts can differ: their preferences and their precision. I treat the former as the primitive
difference between analysts, and the latter as the endogenously derived difference. The
motivation for this specific model choice is that in practice, we do observe that analysts
actively engage in information acquisition through various channels such as developing
industry knowledge and analyzing financial reports. Hence it appears more descriptive to
allow analysts to choose their precision levels.
1.3 The Repeated Communication Game — Exogenous
and Commonly Known Precision
For now, to illustrate the key features of the communication game, I take the analyst’s
precision γJ as exogenously given and commonly known; I will relax this assumption in
Section 1.4. The communication game can be solved by backward induction.
1.3.1 The Second Period Communication Game
At the end of period 1, the investor updates his belief about the analyst’s type according to
(1.2) and the analyst now has a commonly known reputation, λ2, entering period 2. Since
period 2 is the last period, each type of analyst has no incentive to protect her reputation
and simply seeks to maximize her utility in that period.
In line with the cheap talk literature, I assume that informative communication, if it
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can be supported in equilibrium, is played in each period. The following argument demon-
strates that pure strategy informative communication always obtains in the second period.
Suppose this is the case, then a2(1, λ2, γ) > a2(0, λ2, γ).7 Therefore the misaligned an-
alyst has a strict incentive to report 1, and the aligned analyst must have a strict incen-
tive to report her signal truthfully.8 If the investor receives message 0, he will be sure
that the analyst is aligned and truthfully reporting her signal. Given the aligned analyst’s
precision, γA, the investor will assign probability 1 − γA to state 1 and choose action
a2(0, λ2, γ) = 1− γA < 1/2. If the investor receives message 1, he will be uncertain about
the analyst’s type and choose his action based on the updated belief:9




A + (1− λ2)]
1
2
[λ2γA + (1− λ2)] + 12 [λ2(1− γA) + (1− λ2)]
=
1− λ2 + λ2γA
2− λ2 .
Clearly, a2(1, λ2, γ) ∈ [1/2, γA] > a2(0, λ2, γ). Therefore, the misaligned analyst will
indeed always report 1. It is also shown in footnote 10 that the aligned analyst will indeed
7In Section 1.3, since the analyst’s precision γJ is exogenous and commonly known, the players’ strate-
gies and belief functions depend no longer on their conjectures about the analyst’s precision, instead they
depend on the commonly known γ = (γA, γM ).
8The argument is as follows: given that the misaligned analyst reports 1 all the time, for a2(1, λ2, γ) >
a2(0, λ2, γ) to hold, the aligned analyst must report 1 more often when she observes signal 1 than when she
observes signal 0. Since I focus here on pure strategies, this means the aligned analyst must report her signal
truthfully.
9This confirms Morgan and Stocken’s (2003) finding that the investor’s uncertainty about the analyst’s
incentive makes it impossible for the aligned analyst to credibly reveal good news.
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truthfully report her signal.10 Hence pure strategy informative communication does obtain
in the second period.11
In addition, all else equal, the action induced by a high second-period report, a2(1, λ2, γ),
is increasing in analyst reputation λ2. The higher the probability with which an analyst is
believed to be aligned, the more credible her report is perceived to be, and hence the in-
vestor will choose a higher action accordingly.
Given analyst reputation λ2, write V J(λ2, γ) for the type J analyst’s second period
expected utility when the analyst’s precision is γ ≡ (γA, γM). The aligned analyst’s second
period expected utility (anticipating she will report truthfully) is therefore:
V A(λ2, γ) = −1
2
γA[a2(1, λ2, γ)− 1]2 − 1
2
(1− γA)[a2(0, λ2, γ)− 1]2
−1
2
(1− γA)[a2(1, λ2, γ)− 0]2 − 1
2
γA[a2(0, λ2, γ)− 0]2
= −(λ2 − 1)
2 + 2γA(γA − 1)(λ22 − 2)
2(λ2 − 2)2 . (1.3)
10If the aligned analyst observes signal 0, she will compare her payoff conditional on sending message
0, UA2 (m2 = 0, s2 = 0, λ2, γ
A) = −γA(a2(0, λ2, γ) − 0)2 − (1 − γA)(a2(0, λ2, γ) − 1)2, with her pay-
off conditional on sending message 1, UA2 (m2 = 1, s2 = 0, λ2, γ
A) = −γA(a2(1, λ2, γ) − 0)2 − (1 −
γA)(a2(1, λ2, γ)− 1)2. It is straightforward to show that UA2 (m2 = 0, s2 = 0, λ2, γA)−UA2 (m2 = 1, s2 =
0, λ2, γ
A) = (a2(1, λ2, γ)− a2(0, λ2, γ))[a2(1, λ2, γ) + a2(0, λ2, γ)− 2(1− γA)] > 0. Hence the aligned
analyst will indeed report 0 when she observes signal 0. Similarly, it can be shown that the aligned analyst
will indeed report 1 when she observes signal 1.
11In fact it can be shown that this pure strategy informative equilibrium is the unique informative equilib-
rium in the second period.
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The misaligned analyst’s second period expected utility equals:
V M(λ2, γ) = −[a2(1, λ2, γ)− 1]2
= −(λ2γ
A − 1)2
(λ2 − 2)2 . (1.4)




(1− λ2)(2γA − 1)2




2(2γA − 1)(1− λ2γA)








A − 1)(3− 2γA − λ2)
(2− λ2)3 < 0.
Both types of analysts benefit from a high reputation, with the misaligned analyst bene-
fiting even more. To generate intuition for this result, notice that the investor’s action upon
receiving message 1 is increasing in analyst reputation λ2, while the action induced by
message 0 is independent of λ2. The misaligned analyst always reports 1 and hence her
reputation pays off in all scenarios. In contrast, with (ex-ante) probability 1/2, the aligned
analyst reports 0, in which case her payoff is independent of her reputation, λ2. Only with
the remaining probability, the aligned analyst reports 1 and may benefit from her reputa-
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tion. Therefore, the misaligned analyst is more likely to exploit her reputation and hence
benefits more from a high reputation than her aligned peer.
To conclude, in the second period, the aligned analyst reports truthfully and the mis-
aligned analyst always reports 1. Both types of analysts benefit from a high reputation with
the misaligned analyst benefiting from it even more than the aligned one.
1.3.2 The First Period Communication Game
In the first communication period, the analyst needs to anticipate the repuational conse-
quences of the second period and takes these into consideration as she chooses her first
period communication strategy. Specifically, the aligned analyst’s objective in the first
communication period includes both her first period payoff and her second period expected
utility, and is given by
−xA(a1 − w1)2 + (1− xA)V A(Λ(m1, w1|γ), γ).
Analogously, the misaligned analyst’s objective in the first communication period is given
by
−xM(a1 − 1)2 + (1− xM)V M(Λ(m1, w1|γ), γ).
According to definition 2, first period communication can be informative in terms of
either the analyst’s type or the underlying state. I argue that in equilibrium, however, it has
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to convey information about both dimensions. Suppose it only conveyed information about
the underlying state, while being uninformative about the analyst’s type. In this case, the
analyst, having no reputational consideration, would act only on her current reporting in-
centives in that the aligned analyst would tell the truth, while the misaligned analyst would
always report 1. However, these optimal reporting strategies themselves are informative
about the analyst’s type, indicating a contradiction. On the other hand, suppose commu-
nication in the first period were uninformative about the underlying state, yet informative
about the analyst’s type. In that case, since there would be no current reporting conse-
quences, both types of analysts would end up choosing the same communication strategy
that will bring them higher reputation, which makes communication completely uninfor-
mative, indicating another contradiction. Thus in equilibrium, informative communication
in the first period must convey information about both dimensions.
The striking finding of Morris (2001) is that when the aligned analyst cares a lot about
the future, i.e., xA becomes small, then no information can be conveyed in the first period.
I replicate Morris’ result in my setting in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 (Morris 2001) Suppose both types of analysts have the same precision, i.e.,
γA = γM . For any xM , there exist cutoff values xA(λ, γA, γM , xM) ≤ x¯A(λ, γA, γM , xM)
such that if the aligned analyst’s future concerns are sufficiently high, i.e., xA < xA(λ, γA, γM , xM),
communication in the first period is babbling. On the other hand, if and only if the aligned
analyst’s future concerns are sufficiently low, i.e., xA > x¯A(λ, γA, γM , xM), there exists
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a truth-telling equilibrium in which the aligned analyst truthfully reports her signal in the
first period.
To understand the intuition behind this result, firstly I argue that, when both types of an-
alysts have the same precision, there is only one way to build reputation for being aligned,
which is to issue a low report. Therefore, both types of analysts will have reputational
incentives to report 0. If the aligned analyst’s future concerns are sufficiently high, then
her reputational reporting incentive dominates and she will report 0 all the time. One
would think that such communication can still be informative since the misaligned ana-
lyst’s communication strategy may be signal-dependent. However the following argument
demonstrates that this cannot be the case.
Suppose in an informative communication equilibrium, the aligned analyst always re-
ports 0, independent of her signal. Furthermore, the misaligned analyst reports 1 more
often when she observes signal 1 compared with signal 0, i.e., σM1 (1) > σ
M
1 (0), because,
as assumed without loss of generality above, a1(m1 = 1) ≥ a1(m1 = 0). This implies
that the misaligned analyst reports 1 more often given state 1 than he does given state 0.
If indeed the aligned analyst reports 0 all the time, then the investor will rationally antici-
pate that: (1) the possibility of a report 0 coming from the aligned analyst is higher if the
state is 1 than if the state is 0, which implies that Λ(0, 1) > Λ(0, 0); (2) the analyst must
be misaligned if the report is 1, i.e., Λ(1, 1) = Λ(1, 0) = 0. Therefore the reputation en-
hancement by reporting 0 when the state is 1 is greater than that when the state is 0, i.e.,
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Λ(0, 1) − Λ(1, 1) > Λ(0, 0) − Λ(1, 0). This in turn implies that the misaligned analyst
has stronger reputational incentive to report 0 when she observes signal 1 rather than sig-
nal 0. Now recall that the misaligned analyst’s current reporting incentive is independent
of her signal. Therefore, the misaligned analyst will report 1 more often when her signal
is 0, i.e., σM1 (1) ≤ σM1 (0), which contradicts σM1 (1) > σM1 (0). Hence, for first period
communication to be informative, the aligned analyst cannot report 0 all the time.
On the other hand, if the aligned analyst cares a lot about her current payoff, then her
current reporting incentive dominates and she will report her signal truthfully.
The above result is valid for any xM . Note that those cutoff values, xA(λ, γA, γM , xM)
and x¯A(λ, γA, γM , xM), are functions of xM . Roughly speaking, here in the proposed
first period informative communication equilibrium, the misaligned analyst’s reputational
incentive is to report 0, while her current incentive is to report 1. Therefore, her future
concerns, xM , play an important role in determining her equilibrium strategy, which, in
turn, affects how the investor should update his beliefs and further both types of analysts’
reputational and current reporting incentives. To get an idea about the values of those cut-
offs xA(λ, γA, γM , xM) and x¯A(λ, γA, γM , xM), the following result considers the special
case where xM → 0.12
Corollary 1 Suppose both types of analysts have the same precision, i.e., γA = γM . If
the misaligned analyst has (weakly) higher future concerns than the aligned analyst, i.e.,
12I would like to give special thanks to Marina Halac and Navin Kartik for pointing out a mistake in the
previous version. The new Lamma 1 and Corollary 1 are inspired by their comments.
24
xA ≥ xM , then for xM → 0, a truth-telling equilibrium exists in which the aligned
analyst truthfully reports her signal in the first period. In other words, for xM → 0,
xA(λ, γA, γM , xM) ≤ x¯A(λ, γA, γM , xM) ≤ xM .
When both types of analysts have the same precision, the misaligned analyst has the
ability to mimic the aligned analyst. If the misaligned analyst cares (almost) only about the
future, she will certainly try to mimic her aligned peer. As a result, the two types of analysts
will follow sufficiently similar strategies, which, in turn, makes the reputation enhancement
by reporting 0 sufficiently small. Therefore, given xA ≥ xM , the aligned analyst’s current
reporting incentive dominates (even if xA → 0) and she will report her signal truthfully.
If the misaligned analyst has more precise information than the aligned analyst, then
the above arguments apply, a fortiori. Hence, the same result prevails, in that first period
communication takes the form of babbling when the aligned analyst’s future concerns are
sufficiently high. I now ask the central question for the remainder of this section: if the
aligned analyst has greater precision, can informative (first period) communication obtain
in equilibrium?
Proposition 1 Suppose it is common knowledge that the aligned analyst is better informed
than the misaligned analyst, i.e., γA > γM ; then there exists value xM(λ, γA, γM) such
that given the misaligned analyst’s important future concerns, i.e., xM < xM(λ, γA, γM),
there exists an equilibrium in which both types of analysts truthfully report their signals in
the first period.
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The value of xM(λ, γA, γM) is derived in the Appendix.13 If the aligned analyst is better
informed than the misaligned analyst, then informative communication may resurface in
the first period regardless of the aligned analyst’s time preferences.
For an aligned analyst who has an informational advantage, there are two possible ways
to build reputation for being aligned: (1) by issuing a report as accurately as possible; and
(2) by issuing a low report, since it is commonly known that the misaligned analyst is
upwardly biased. Suppose the first mechanism dominates; then both types of analysts will
have reputational incentives to truthfully report their signals. For the aligned analyst, she
now has both current and reputational incentives to tell the truth and hence will report
her signal truthfully. For the misaligned analyst, when her future concerns are sufficiently
important, her reputational reporting incentive dominates and hence she will also truthfully
report her signal. Given that both types of analysts tell the truth and the aligned analyst has a
higher precision, it is indeed rational for the investor to update favorably about the analyst’s
type when the report is consistent with the realized state. On the other hand, suppose
the second mechanism dominates and the investor updates favorably when he receives a
low report, independent of the realized state. Then, when the misaligned analyst’s future
concerns are sufficiently important, her reputational reporting incentive dominates and she
will always issue a low report, which actually makes the investor’s updating rule irrational.
13Note that the cutoff xM (·) is independent of xA. The reason is as follows. If the aligned analyst is better
informed than the misaligned analyst, in the postulated informative communication equilibrium, both the
aligned analyst’s reputational and current reporting incentives are to report truthfully. Therefore the aligned
analyst’s future concerns, xA, will not affect her equilibrium strategy, and hence will have no effect on the
analyst’s current and reputational reporting incentives.
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Therefore, when the misaligned analyst values her future a lot, the first mechanism prevails
in equilibrium; i.e., the analyst builds reputation for being aligned by issuing reports as
accurately as possible.
To conclude, for exogenous and commonly known precision, if the misaligned analyst
has equal or higher precision than the aligned analyst, and the aligned analyst’s future con-
cerns are sufficiently important, first period communication takes the form of babbling. On
the contrary, if the aligned analyst is better informed, informative communication can ob-
tain in the first period if the misaligned analyst values future a lot. In the following section,
I endogenize the analyst’s precision choice and assume it is unobservable to the investor. To
better analyze the implications of reputational concerns, from now on, I focus on the more
interesting case where the misaligned analyst has important reputational concerns and as a
maintained assumption, assume xM < xM(λ, γA, γM).
1.4 Unobservable Choice of Precision
In this section, I refer back to my original model where the analyst’s precision choice is
endogenous and unobservable. First, it is necessary to note that with unobservable pre-
cision choice, the communication game starts from a non-singleton information set and
hence is not a proper subgame. However, any informative communication in the full game
satisfies the properties characterized in the case where the analyst’s precision is exogenous
and commonly known. This is because in equilibrium, the investor’s conjecture about the
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analyst’s precision is consistent with the analyst’s actual precision choice. Hence, although
the analyst’s chosen precision is unobservable, in equilibrium it will be commonly known.
If information-gathering costs are very high, then neither type of analyst will acquire
information. In this case, by Lemma 1, first period communication is babbling when the
aligned analyst cares a lot about the future.
If information-gathering costs are moderate, additional analysis is needed in order to
understand which analyst will acquire information. To see this, it is helpful to note that,
loosely speaking, the analyst benefits from acquiring information through two channels:
First, more precise information increases the analyst’s ability to build reputation. Recall
that while both types of analysts benefit from a high reputation, the misaligned analyst
benefits even more so than does the aligned analyst. Second, more precise information en-
ables the analyst to guide the investor toward more profitable decisions, holding reputation
constant. The aligned analyst’s internalizing the investor’s preference in effect increases
her payoff. In contrast, precision, per se, does not matter to the misaligned analyst because
her payoff is independent of the state. For later reference, I label the first channel the “repu-
tation effect” and the second channel the “precision effect”. Based on combining these two
arguments, it is not clear, a priori, which type of analyst has a stronger incentive to acquire
information. The following proposition evaluates this trade-off. To that end, denote by ∆J
the type J analyst’s benefit from acquiring information.
Proposition 2 Suppose γH → 1 and γL ≥ 0.75. If the misaligned analyst’s future con-
28
cerns are important, i.e., xM < xM(λ, γH , γL), then for moderate information-gathering
costs, i.e., ∆ < c < ∆¯, there exists an informative equilibrium in which only the aligned
analyst acquires information and communication in each period is informative. Specifi-
cally, both types of analysts report truthfully in the first period. In the second period, the
aligned analyst reports truthfully and the misaligned analyst reports 1 all the time.
The values of ∆ and ∆¯ are derived in the Appendix. Following the rationale established
in Section 1.3.1 and Proposition 1, it is straightforward to demonstrate that: If the investor
holds the (proposed equilibrium) conjectures that: (a) only the aligned analyst acquires
information, (b) in the first period both types of analysts truthfully report their signals, and
(c) in the second period the aligned analyst reports truthfully and the misaligned analyst
always reports 1, then for xM < xM(λ, γH , γL), the optimal communication strategies of
the analyst with conjectured precision (as in (a)) are indeed consistent with the investor’s
conjectures about the analyst’s communication behaviors (as in (b) and (c)). Now it remains
to show that for ∆ < c < ∆¯, the analyst’s precision choice is consistent with the investor’s
conjecture (as in (a)). To that end, we need also examine the analyst’s communication
behaviors for off-equilibrium precision.
Given the investor’s above (proposed equilibrium) conjectures about the analyst’s pre-
cision choice and communication behaviors, as I show in the Appendix, under the technical
conditions that γH → 1 and γL ≥ 0.75, the aligned analyst will report her signal truthfully
in each period even if her true precision is the off-equilibrium precision, γL. That is, she
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will truthfully report in each period irrespective of her true precision. Write V J(λ2, γJ , γ˜A)
for the type J analyst’s second period expected utility when her reputation is λ2, actual pre-
cision is γJ and the investor’s conjecture of the aligned analyst’s precision is γ˜A.14 Hence
the aligned analyst’s utility at the information acquisition stage if her actual precision is γk,
where k ∈ {H,L}, is as follows (the arguments in a1(·) are m1, γ˜A, and γ˜M ):
UA0 (γ
















(1− γk)[−xA(a1(1, γH , γL))2 + (1− xA)V A(Λ(1, 0|γH , γL), γk, γH)]− 1H(γk)c,
where the indicator variable 1H(·) = 1 if γk = γH , and 1H(·) = 0 if γk = γL.
Therefore, the benefit to the aligned analyst from acquiring information can be calcu-
lated as
∆A ≡ UA0 (γA = γH |γ˜A = γH , γ˜M = γL) + c− UA0 (γA = γL|γ˜A = γH , γ˜M = γL).
Given that the aligned analyst will truthfully report in each period irrespective of her true
14Note that γ˜M does not affect V J(·) because the misaligned analyst always reports 1 in the second period,
independent of her precision. For the same reason, holding reputation λ2 constant, VM (·) is also independent
of her actual precision γM . Hence, later I suppress the argument γM in VM (·).
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precision, better information will not only enable the aligned analyst to provide more ac-
curate guidance to the investor; it will also increase her ability to build reputation. Hence
the aligned analyst’s total benefit from acquiring information consists of “reputation effect”
and two periods’ “precision effect”, i.e., ∆A = REA + PEA1 + PE
A
2 = ∆¯, where RE
J
and PEJt represent, respectively, type J analyst’s “reputation effect” and period t “preci-
sion effect”. (REA, PEA1 , and PE
A
2 are formally derived in the Appendix - the proof of
Proposition 2.)
For the misaligned analyst, in contrast, the alternate logic ensues: Given the investor’s
conjectures that only the aligned analyst acquires information and both types of analysts tell
the truth in the first period, the investor will favorably update his belief about the analyst’s
type when the report is consistent with the realized state. Hence, the misaligned analyst
will have greater reputational incentive to tell the truth when her precision is higher. At
the same time, the misaligned analyst’s current incentive to report 1 is independent of her
precision. As a result, holding the investor’s strategy constant, having a higher precision
would make the misaligned analyst more likely to report truthfully. Remember that, for
xM < xM(λ, γH , γL), by Proposition 1, the misaligned analyst with the default precision
will report her signal truthfully. It stands to reason, then, that the misaligned analyst will
also report her signal truthfully as she becomes better informed. That is, having a higher
precision does not affect the misaligned analyst’s communication strategy, which in turn
leaves her first period payoff unaffected (since the misaligned analyst’s first period payoff
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depends only on her report).15 Thus, by acquiring information, the misaligned analyst








(γH − γL)(1− xM){V M(Λ(1, 1|γH , γL), γ˜A = γH)− V M(Λ(0, 1|γH , γL), γ˜A = γH)}
≡ REM = ∆.
Now it remains to show that ∆¯ > ∆, i.e., the aligned analyst benefits more from ac-
quiring information than does the misaligned analyst. This distinction may seem trivial at
first glance, since the aligned analyst benefits from both “reputation effect” and “precision
effect”, while the misaligned analyst benefits only from “repuation effect”. However, recall
that the misaligned analyst is the one who reaps the greater benefit from a high reputation,
thus further analysis is needed in order to evaluate this trade-off.
As will be demonstrated below, the aligned analyst’s “precision effect” is greater than
the misaligned analyst’s “reputation effect”, i.e., PEA1 + PE
A
2 > RE
M , hence overall,
the aligned analyst benefits more from higher precision than does the misaligned analyst.
To illustrate this observation, first note that higher precision enables the analyst to provide
more accurate guidance to the investor, even holding reputation constant. In other words,
the analyst’s “precision effect” comes from her impact on the investor’s decision in each
period by improving her report (from inaccurate to accurate). In contrast, the analyst’s
15Note that the ex ante probability for the analyst to observe 0 and 1 is always 12 irrespective of her
precision.
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“reputation effect” comes from her impact on the investor’s decision in the second period
by improving her reputation. The key to understanding Proposition 2 now is that the aligned
analyst’s impact on the investor’s decision in each period through differential reporting
is greater than the misaligned analyst’s impact on the investor’s second period decision
through differential reputation. Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3 demonstrates this point. In the
first period, both types of analysts truthfully report their signals. Hence, the impact of
differential reporting on the investor’s decision is
a1(m1 = 1, λ)− a1(m1 = 0, λ) = 2λγH + 2(1− λ)γL − 1 > 2γL − 1 > γH − 1
2
given γL ≥ 0.75. In the second period, the aligned analyst truthfully reports her signal
while the misaligned analyst always reports 1. Hence, a2(m2 = 0, λ2) = 1 − γH , and
a2(m2 = 1, λ2) depends on the analyst’s reputation λ2. Clearly a2(m2 = 1, λ2 = 0) = 12
and a2(m2 = 1, λ2 = 1) = γH . Therefore, the maximum effect of differential reputation
on the investor’s second period decision is γH − 12 , while the minimum effect of differential
reporting on the investor’s decision (each period) is γH − 12 . In other words, the aligned
analyst’s differential reporting has a bigger impact on the investor’s decision than does the
misaligned analyst’s differential reputation. Hence, the aligned analyst’s “precision effect”
is greater than the misaligned analyst’s “reputation effect”, and thus overall, the aligned
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Figure 1.3: The impact of m2 and λ2 on a2(m2, λ2)
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I now address the remaining case of small information-gathering costs:
Proposition 3 Suppose the analyst becomes almost perfectly informed after she acquires
information, i.e., γH → 1. Then for xM < xM(λ, γH , γL) and xA ∈ (0, xA(λ, γH , γL, xM)]∪
[xM ,∞), there exists value co such that for small information-gathering costs, i.e., c < co,
there exists a unique informative equilibrium in which only the aligned analyst acquires
information, first period communication is babbling and second period communication is
informative.
To facilitate the argument, it is useful to first identify the following property of first
period informative communication when both types of analysts have the same precision.
That is, in equilibrium the misaligned analyst must have positive probability to report 1
irrespective of her signal. As observed in the identical precision case, in any first period
informative communication, it must be true that the misaligned analyst reports 1 more often
than does the aligned analyst. Recall, as well, that the aligned analyst truthfully reports 0
if she observes signal 0, because both her reputational and current reporting incentives
suggest so. Now suppose that the misaligned analyst also truthfully reports 0 given signal
0. Then, the difference in communication strategy between aligned and misaligned analysts
must be based on signal 1. Given that the signal is informative, the reputation enhancement
(by reporting 0) when the state is 1 is greater than that when the state is 0, which implies
that the misaligned analyst would have stronger reputational incentive to report 0 when
she observes signal 1 rather than signal 0. Observing that the misaligned analyst’s current
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reporting incentive is independent of her signal, the misaligned analyst would thus report
0 more often given signal 1 than given signal 0, which, combined with the supposition that
the misaligned analyst reports 0 given signal 0, implies that the misaligned analyst would
report 0 all the time. This contradicts the property that the misaligned analyst reports 1
more often than does the aligned analyst. Hence the misaligned analyst will have positive
probability to report 1 given signal 0, and also a fortiori, given signal 1.
If analysts’ information-gathering costs are small, then the aligned analyst is always
better off acquiring information even by the second period “precision effect” alone. Given
that the aligned analyst acquires information, I claim that the misaligned analyst will main-
tain her default precision for the following reasons: as argued in the preceding paragraph, if
in equilibrium both types of analysts acquire information, then the misaligned analyst must
have positive probability to report 1 irrespective of her signal. It is shown in the Appendix
that holding the investor’s strategy unchanged, the misaligned analyst with the default pre-
cision γL also has positive probability to report 1 for either signal. Therefore, by the defini-
tion of mixed strategy, the misaligned analyst’s utility at the information acquisition stage
in either case — with or without acquiring information — can be calculated by assuming
that she always reports 1 in the first period (holding the investor’s strategy unchanged).
As a result, the misaligned analyst has no incentive to acquire information simply because
the benefit of doing so is zero. Given that only the aligned analyst acquires information,
the first period communication has to be babbling for small information-gathering costs;
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otherwise, the misaligned analyst would also choose to acquire information for reputation
building purposes (since c < co = ∆M ), which contradicts the afore presented argument.16
At first glance, Proposition 3 seems to conflict with Proposition 1, since the latter states
that first period informative communication obtains for xM < xM(λ, γA, γM) if the aligned
analyst is better informed. However, recall that Proposition 1 speaks to the case where ana-
lysts’ precision is common knowledge. When analysts’ precision choices are unobservable,
then one has to take into consideration possible deviations not only regarding analysts’ re-
porting strategies, but also regarding their precision choices when analyzing whether first
period informative communication can be sustained in equilibrium.
To conclude, for the most interesting case where both types of analysts’ future con-
cerns are important, I find that if information-gathering costs are sufficiently small, only the
aligned analyst acquires information and first period communication is uninformative. Fur-
ther, if information-gathering costs are moderate, again only the aligned analyst acquires
information but first period communication becomes informative. If information-gathering
costs are high, neither analyst acquires information and first period communication reverts
to babbling.
16The condition xA ∈ (0, xA(λ, γH , γL, xM )] ∪ [xM ,∞) is required to guarantee that both types of an-
alysts truthfully reporting is the unique informative communication for xM < xM (λ, γH , γL). Therefore




In general, analysts’ information-gathering costs are influenced by many factors: access to
management inside information, complexity of industry knowledge, transparency of finan-
cial disclosure, etc. All else equal, the more transparent the financial disclosure, the lower
the analysts’ information-gathering costs. Proponents of increased transparency usually
base their arguments on the conventional wisdom that higher transparency would increase
the welfare of financially unsophisticated investors. However, it has been argued that reg-
ulatory acts requiring increased transparency (e.g., FAS 131 segment reporting) impose
significant “implementation costs” on firms and hence, the social welfare consequences of
such regulatory acts are up for debate. The following analysis points out that even without
such implementation costs, greater transparency may decrease social welfare, by reducing
the informativeness of communication between analysts and investors.
Corollary 2 Suppose γH → 1, γL ≥ 0.75 and all players (both types of analysts and
the investor) have the same future concerns, i.e., xA = xM = xI = x. Consider c1 =
co − δ and c2 = co + ε, then if the players’ future concerns are sufficiently high, i.e.,
x < xM(λ, γH , γL), then for δ → 0 and ε→ 0, decreasing analysts’ information-gathering
costs from c2 to c1 reduces social welfare.
Consider the case where future concerns are important. Then, Proposition 2 has shown
that for moderate information-gathering costs, there exists an informative equilibrium in
which only the aligned analyst acquires information and both types of analysts tell the
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truth in the first period. In contrast, by Proposition 3, given certain regulatory conditions,
communication in the first period takes the form of babbling if the analyst’s costs of ac-
quiring information are small. That is, if information-gathering costs decrease from c2 to
c1, communication in the first period changes from informative to babbling.
First period informative communication not only enables the investor to make better
concurrent decisions, but also facilitates learning about the analyst’s type, which leads to
better decision making in the second period. Similarly, the aligned analyst, who internal-
izes the investor’s payoff, is also better off under informative communication, given that
the additional information-gathering costs are negligible as postulated in Corollary 2. In
contrast, informative communication leaves the misaligned analyst worse off. To see this,
note that the misaligned analyst’s payoff in the first period,−(a1(·)−1)2, is independent of
the state and increasing and concave in the investor’s action. If first period communication
is informative, then the investor’s investment decision will be contingent non-trivially on
the analyst’s report; given the concavity of the misaligned analyst’s first period payoff, this
will make her worse off for the first period (by Jensen’s inequality). In addition, when first
period communication is informative, the misaligned analyst cannot completely pool with
the aligned analyst, which reduces her payoff for the second period (recall that babbling
amounts to complete pooling of analysts’ types).
Given the countervailing effects of first period communication on the various players’
payoffs, a tradeoff arises. Corollary 2 evaluates this tradeoff, with social welfare W (·)
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Figure 1.4: Social welfare as a function of c
For this figure, the parameter values are x = 0.05, γH → 1, γL = 0.8 and λ = 0.5.
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(before she learns her type). I show in the proof of Corollary 2 that:
W (c = c2)−W (c = c1) = 1
2
xλ(a1(1)− a1(0))− λ(c2 − c1).
The first term captures the net effect of the investor making informative decisions, whereas
the second term represents the difference in analysts’ information-gathering costs. Clearly,
the first term is positive, and the second term approaches zero when the cost difference
is negligible. Hence, social welfare is reduced when information-gathering costs decrease
from c2 to c1 (see Figure 1.4).
Fischer and Stocken (2010) derive a related result. They find that in some circum-
stances, more precise public information may “crowd out” analysts’ private information,
making the investor strictly worse off. My analysis shows that in the presence of repu-
tation formation, increased transparency may sometimes impede communication between
analysts and investors, and hence may have negative social welfare consequences.
1.6 Empirical Implications
This paper generates several empirical predictions consistent with extant empirical studies.
First, the model suggests that analysts with better reputation have greater impact on in-
vestors’ decisions, in line with Stickel (1992), Park and Stice (2000) and Jackson (2005).17
17In these studies, analyst reputation is with regard to the precision, not the levels of misalignment. How-
ever, these two different dichotomies converge as aligned analysts have higher precision in equilibrium when
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Second, higher reputation analysts have better future performance. This, too, is consis-
tent with Stickel (1992) and Desai, Liang and Singh (2000), among others. Third, the
model suggests that in general, analysts’ reputation is increasing in their forecast accuracy,
consistent with Chen, Francis, and Jiang (2005) and Jackson (2005). Fourth, on average,
analysts’ reports are informative (e.g., Dimson and Marsh (1984), Womack (1996)), but
optimistic (e.g., O’Brien (1988), Lys and Sohn (1990), Brown (1993), Dugar and Nathan
(1995)). Fifth, if one interprets aligned analysts as unaffiliated and misaligned analysts as
affiliated— a reasonable link at least before the Global Settlement— this paper predicts that
affiliated analysts issue more optimistic reports than do unaffiliated analysts, which is again
confirmed by most empirical findings (e.g., Dugar and Nathan (1995), Lin and McNichols
(1998), Michaely and Womack (1999)).
The model also generates new empirical implications. Proposition 2 suggests that in
general, aligned analysts tend to have more precise information and are more likely to re-
port truthfully. Hence, from an ex post perspective, my model predicts an endogenous
association between analysts’ forecast accuracy and bias. More specifically, analysts with
higher forecast accuracy are less optimistic. This prediction is confirmed by Conroy and
Harris (1995). However, Lim (2001) and several other studies (e.g., Chen and Matsumoto
(2006)) hold the contrary view that more optimistic analysts tend to be more accurate
because of privileged access to management inside information. Regulation FD aims to
information-gathering costs are moderate. Hence, in equilibrium analyst reputation conveys information both
about the levels of misalignment and the precision.
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prohibit selective disclosures with the goal of creating a more even playing field among
analysts. I therefore expect that my model speaks more to the post-Reg FD regime. Fur-
thermore, my results imply that if misaligned analysts have a significant informational ad-
vantage over aligned analysts, then communication may become uninformative. Hence Reg
FD has the additional benefit of fostering communication by limiting misaligned analysts’
informational advantage.
Somewhat surprisingly, Proposition 3 suggests that if learning more about firms comes
at a low cost to analysts (e.g., due to high disclosure standards) and future concerns are
weighted heavily, analysts’ recommendations will be less informative.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper investigates how the presence of reputation formation affects analysts’ strate-
gic communication with investors when analysts can acquire information. If information-
gathering costs are moderate, only aligned analysts acquire information; as a result, infor-
mative communication can be sustained in equilibrium. That is, analysts’ communication
in the reputation formation stage conveys information both about their types (the levels of
misalignment) and their precision (given the endogenous association between the analysts’
types and precision). On the other hand, if information-gathering costs are small and an-
alysts care a lot about the future, communication becomes uninformative. Hence, efforts
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aimed at reducing information-gathering costs for analysts may have adverse effects on
social welfare.
Certain key features of the model warrant further discussion. For example, I assume
that analysts’ precision is perfectly correlated over time. In the extreme opposite case of
zero serial correlation (i.e., acquiring information only increases analysts’ precision in the
first period), neither analyst will acquire information regardless of information-gathering
costs if both types of analysts care a lot about future transactions.18 In practice, however,
some elements of analysts’ information sets are clearly persistent (e.g., industry knowl-
edge, the ability to analyze financial statement). My qualitative findings (assuming perfect
correlation) will continue to hold when the correlation is sufficiently large.
Finally, in this paper I only consider analysts’ messages about their signals. What if
one allows analysts to send multidimensional cheap talk messages? For example, analysts
could send a separate message about their precision in addition to the one about their sig-
nals. Because I confine my attention to pure strategies for analysts’ information acquisition
decisions, this possibility does not affect my analysis. The reason is that, when analysts
are confined to pure strategies for their information acquisition choices, investors will ig-
nore analysts’ separate cheap talk messages about their precision because their precision
18The key to understanding this result is that misaligned analysts benefit more from a high reputation than
do their aligned peers. When both types of analysts have sufficiently important future concerns, they acquire
information mainly for reputation building purposes. Then, whenever it is profitable for the aligned analysts
to acquire information, it is also optimal for the misaligned analysts to do so. Hence, equilibrium cannot
be reached where only the aligned analysts acquire information. At the same time, following the rationale
established in Proposition 3, both types of analysts acquiring information cannot constitute equilibrium either,
because the misaligned analyst has no incentives to acquire information for any level of information-gathering
costs.
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choices are deterministic in equilibrium. An interesting model extension is to allow for
mixed strategies for analysts’ information acquisition decisions. The extent to which this
extension would affect my results has yet to be explored.
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Chapter 2
Board Composition and CEO power
2.1 Introduction
The board of directors performs the dual function of monitoring the firm’s management and
advising it on key decisions. In the wake of major corporate governance failures, commen-
tators have questioned the effectiveness of boards in performing these tasks — especially,
the monitoring task. This concern is rooted in the inherent information asymmetry be-
tween board and management and in the widely held belief that powerful CEOs use their
(often significant) influence over the board’s composition to ensure a “pliable” board.1 The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 was designed in part to strengthen the monitoring func-
tion of the board. Recent evidence in Faleye et al. (2010) suggests, however, that this has
come at the expense of a diminished advisory role. In this paper we develop a model to
1Tirole (2001, p.5) summarizes this succinctly: “Managers value ... lenient oversight”.
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study the link among board composition (holding the board size constant), the assignment
of decision-making authority, and the flow of information inside a firm. We then employ
this model to assess how CEO power affects these constructs — in particular, the board
composition.
We model a firm whose CEO has private information about the NPV-maximizing scale
of investment but is an empire builder. Board members, while internalizing the sharehold-
ers’ objective, have an information disadvantage at the outset. They are either monitoring
or advisory types. The primary task of the “monitors” is to uncover the CEO’s information,
whereas that of the “advisors” is to discover incremental decision-relevant information that
is unbeknownst even to the CEO. In practice, of course, most board members engage in
both monitoring and advising. Yet, they allocate their time across the two tasks according
to their respective background and expertise.2 Our model adopts a reduced form approach
by letting the board composition parameterize the monitoring intensity. As a result, the
information collectively available to the parties is endogenously determined by the board
composition: the more advisors are on the board, the more likely new decision-relevant in-
formation will be discovered but the less effective is the board monitoring, holding constant
the board size.
To study the interplay of board composition and decision making, we consider two
organizational modes. Under centralization, the decision is made by the board. Under del-
2Board members who are financial experts (e.g., accountants or former CFOs) spend more of their time
monitoring and often serve on the audit committee. Former CEOs, consultants or technology and marketing
executives, on the other hand, spend more time advising and often serve on the M&A or investment committee
(a typical advisory function). See Faleye et al. (2011) for details.
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egation, it is made by the CEO unless board monitoring uncovers the CEO’s information,
in which case the board effectively forces the CEO’s hand. Given the information-based
notion of monitoring, our model thus allows for selective intervention. Consistent with
earlier models that have treated the information environment as exogenous (e.g., Dessein
2002, Harris and Raviv 2005, Adams and Ferreira 2007), we find that the less biased is the
CEO, the more the board will delegate.3 This holds regardless of the board composition.
Exploiting the endogenous nature of information in our model, we show that advisor-heavy
boards and centralization of authority are complements. Under centralization the board can
perfectly adjust the investment decision to its own information, whereas under delegation
part of the information is lost in the process of noisy cheap-talk communication — hence,
any new information an advisor-heavy board may discover is more valuable under central-
ization.
In reality, of course, firms choose the board structure and allocation of authority jointly.
In that case, we establish a non-monotonic relationship between CEO bias and board com-
position. For small biases, as those increase, firms will stick to delegation but add moni-
tors to the board, as the value of selective intervention upon successful monitoring grows
larger. As the CEO’s bias increases further, the firm will eventually centralize investment
decisions. This in turn raises the value of board-generated new information, which calls
for more advisors (i.e., fewer monitors) on the board. As CEO bias increases even fur-
3Harris and Raviv (2008) also endogenize the board’s information in that acquiring new information is
individually costly to board members. They study the associated free-rider problem. However, the board in
their model never makes an attempt at uncovering the CEO’s information, i.e., there is no board monitoring
in the sense of our model.
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ther, the firm will again add more monitors to the board, because a highly biased CEO will
submit very noisy signals about his information to the board. Empirically, therefore, the
relationship between agency problems and monitoring intensity of boards may be locally
decreasing in the data, if researchers fail to control for the allocation of decision rights
within firms.
An often voiced concern is that CEOs who can influence the board composition will
nominate fewer monitors in order to have an agreeable board (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach
1998, Tirole 2001). Recent regulations (e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SOX) aim to enhance
the monitoring role of boards, among other things. Ironically, our results suggest that
for such regulations to increase shareholder value, CEO bias has to be small. Only then
does the conventional wisdom prevail that the CEO prefers less board monitoring than do
shareholders. In contrast, we show that more biased CEOs may have incentives to nominate
a more monitor-heavy board, because such a board is more likely to delegate. In other
words, the CEO prefers to be in control of the decision — even if subject to greater scrutiny
and the threat of selective intervention — rather than having authority outright centralized
by an “activist” board that is prone to learn valuable information of its own. Regulations
fostering greater monitoring scrutiny may thus exacerbate imbalances in board composition
precisely in those circumstances (severe agency problems) for which these regulations were
designed.4
4Numerous studies have considered the welfare effects of SOX, mostly on the direct compliance costs
associated with certain SOX provisions, such as Section 404 on internal controls, e.g., Zhang (2007). Our
results demonstrate an additional opportunity cost of strengthening the monitoring role of boards, namely
that the board becomes less productive as a source of strategic advice.
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Short of influencing the board nomination process, CEOs have more subtle means of
entrenching themselves and securing authority within the firm, e.g., by choosing investment
projects that confer them an information advantage (see also Harris and Raviv 2005).5 We
refer to such projects as “complex.” To prevent entrenchment, shareholders may be better
off committing to an advisor-heavy board at the outset. Given the stickiness of boards,
this constitutes a credible commitment to centralize decisions at a later stage even if the
CEO, in the interim, were to choose a complex project. Still, even if CEO entrenchment
can be preempted in equilibrium, the specter of such behavior creates additional costs to
shareholders; again, in the form of an imbalance between the two desired board activities.
Taken together, our results demonstrate that caution is in order when interpreting ob-
served patterns of board composition. Advisor-heavy boards could indicate either negli-
gible agency problems (if CEO entrenchment is not an issue) or severe agency problems
(if shareholders need to actively preempt entrenchment by a highly biased CEO). From
an empirical perspective, this highlights the need for careful contextual analysis and by
controlling for proxies of CEO power such as chairman duality, tenure, founder status, etc.
Related literature. The view of boards serving a dual role as advisors and monitors
dates back to Mace (1971). While most of the literature has focused on the relationship
between inside and outside board members (e.g., Raheja 2005, Adams and Ferreira 2007,
Harris and Raviv 2008, Linck et al. 2008), Linck et al. (2009) and Adams (2009) have
5This argument has been made by Shleifer and Vishny (1989) and Edlin and Stiglitz (1995) in connection
with CEO replacements.
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brought the dual functional role (a la Mace) back to the fore by documenting a shift toward
board monitoring as a result of SOX (see also Becht et al. 2008).6 Faleye et al. (2010)
study the tradeoff between monitoring and advising empirically and find that this increase
in board scrutiny has come at a significant cost in terms of suboptimal advising, especially
as it relates to acquisitions and innovation. Throughout our model we assume the board is
fully aligned with the interest of shareholders, which is consistent with it including mostly
outsiders.7 Our focus is therefore not on the insiders/outsiders dichotomy but on the ques-
tion what kind of outsiders should be nominated.8
Directly examining the different functional roles of boards, Baker and Gompers (2003)
study the implications of venture capitalist representation. VCs perform both advisory and
monitoring roles, yet Baker and Gompers conclude that VCs mostly substitute for “instru-
mental directors,” who would be classified as advisors according to our taxonomy. Consis-
tent with our model predictions, the authors find that boards with greater VC representation
tend to be more actively involved in decision-making.
6Linck et al. (2009, p.3289): “The composition of the boards...changes with relatively more lawyers and
financial experts and relatively fewer executives from other firms than before SOX.”
7Harris and Raviv (2010) and Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2010) study biased boards in strategic communi-
cation settings.
8Jensen (1993) observes that insiders make for bad monitors, which suggests equating insiders with ad-
visors, and outsiders with monitors. This approach is taken in numerous empirical studies. For instance,
Coles et al. (2008) and Bathala and Rao (1995), respectively, find that firms with higher R&D expenditures
or more growth options have more advisory needs and nominate more insiders to the board. More generally,
Lehn et al. (2004) show that, over the life cycle of firms, boards become more outsider-heavy, consistent
with the view that mature firms are plagued by more severe agency problems. However, this mapping is far
from clear. For instance, outsiders may be former entrepreneurs (more likely to be advisors — see Bhagat
and Black (1999) on high-growth firms), or bankers, former regulators/public sector officials or CPAs (more
likely to be monitors). Caution therefore is in order when linking our results to empirical findings along the
insiders/outsiders dichotomy.
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Regarding the issue of CEO power, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) find that CEOs
frequently play a key role in the board nomination process. In a dynamic model, Hermalin
and Weisbach (1998) show how CEO power arises endogenously as a result of delivered
performance. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) and Edlin and Stiglitz (1995) demonstrate how
managers can entrench themselves by choosing complex strategies or products. We will
take the extent of CEO power as given in (some parts of) our model and study its effect on
board composition.
Technically, our paper is related to Harris and Raviv (2005, 2008, 2010), and Adams
and Ferreira (2007). Building on the work of Dessein (2002), these studies analyze strategic
communication between the board and the CEO. Our paper adds to this stream of literature
by investigating the role of CEO power, monitoring as a source of information for the board,
and selective intervention. Adams and Ferreira (2007) also study board monitoring, but
they model monitoring as a power struggle between the board and CEO, with independent
boards having lower cost of wrestling away control from the CEO. Our notion of board
monitoring differs in that it centers on information collection. Harris and Raviv (2008) also
model the board’s acquisition of “new” information (and the attendant free-rider problem),
but they do not consider board monitoring.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 lays out the model.
Section 2.3 looks at special cases where either the allocation of decision rights or the board
composition is exogenously specified. In Section 2.4, shareholders choose both these de-
sign variables endogenously. Section 2.5 considers the case where a powerful CEO de-
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termines (or influences) the board composition. Section 2.6 analyzes the case of CEO
entrenchment through choosing complex projects. Section 2.7 concludes. All proofs are
contained in the appendix.
2.2 Model
We model the strategic interaction between a privately informed CEO of a firm and its
board of directors. We take the board size as given and focus on the interaction between
board composition and the allocation of decision-making authority.9 To capture the dual
role of boards parsimoniously, let x ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of board members engaged
in monitoring (the “monitoring” types) and 1 − x the fraction of board members engaged
in generating information incremental to that held by the CEO (the “advisory” types). As
noted in the introduction, this is a reduced-form representation of a more general model
where board members specialize endogenously according to their respective expertise. For
instance, former CFOs serving on boards often focus on the monitoring function whereas
marketing executives tend to focus on advising.
The firm faces an investment decision, denoted by y ∈ R. In line with earlier studies
by Harris and Raviv (2005, 2008, 2010) and Adams and Ferreira (2007), both the CEO and
the board want to adjust the investment decision to some state of the world, θ. The board
aims to maximize shareholder value (i.e., the NPV), which is represented by the following
9Several empirical studies have shown negative correlation between board size and firm performance
beyond a certain board size, e.g., Yermack (1996), Eisenberg et al. (1998).
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quadratic loss function (ignoring lump sum terms):
−(y − θ)2. (2.1)
The CEO on the other hand is biased towards larger investments, possibly due to empire
benefits, and aims to maximize
−(y − θ − b)2, b > 0. (2.2)
Throughout the paper we assume that the CEO’s bias parameter b is commonly known at
the outset. We do not model compensation as a means to align the CEO’s incentives with
that of the shareholders: in practice, the higher the CEO’s pay-performance sensitivity, the
lower one would expect the bias, b, to be. The state variable is additively separable over
two signals, each independently uniformly distributed: θ = a + p, where a ∼ U [0, A] and
p ∼ U [0, P ]. The CEO observes a with certainty, whereas the board may observe a and/or
p. We assume that it is common knowledge whether the board is informed about a or p.
The probability that the board learns the state variables depends on the board compo-
sition. In particular, for given fraction of monitoring types, x, the board observes a with
probability qa(x), and p with probability qp(x). The higher is x, the higher is qa(x) (better
monitoring) but the lower is qp(x) (less gathering of new information). That is, engaging in
more monitoring comes at an opportunity cost of reduced board creativity, and vice versa.
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Specifically, we assume that qa(·) ∈ [0, 1), qp(·) ∈ [0, 1), q′a(·) > 0, q′′a(·) ≤ 0, q′p(·) <
0, q′′p(·) ≤ 0. Both board activities are subject to decreasing marginal returns, and the
respective success probabilities are bounded away from one. It seems plausible that even
if the board is entirely devoted to monitoring it will not discover the CEO’s information, a,
with certainty; the same applies to acquiring new information about p.
Throughout the paper we assume that A ≥ P , i.e., the CEO’s private information
is weakly “more important” to the investment decision than the information that may be
discovered by the board. This seems descriptive given the CEO’s proximity to day-to-
day operations. Moreover, in our model, decision-making authority is allocated before the
parties observe their respective information. Our base model is therefore broadly in line
with the “ex-ante environment” in Harris and Raviv (2005). The main modification is that,
if board monitoring uncovers a, the investment decision will be chosen in the interest of the
shareholders under both centralization and delegation as a result of selective intervention
by the board (see the next section for details).10
2.2.1 Payoffs for Given Allocation of Decision Rights
If decision-making is centralized, it is the board that chooses y so as to maximize its ob-
jective in (2.1) given its available information, which may include p and a. If the board has
10Harris and Raviv (2005) show that under certain conditions it is preferable to condition the central-
ization/delegation decision on the realization of p (and possibly a). Harris and Raviv (2008, 2010) further
explore this “ex-post” environment. We also ignore conditional delegation, e.g., delegation up to a spending
limit (as in Melumad and Shibano 1991, Dessein 2002, Alonso and Matouschek 2007), as this would require
a formal contract.
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not learned a through monitoring, it will ask for a report, ra, from the privately informed
CEO. In a setting like ours, it is natural to assume that communication takes the form of
“cheap-talk” (e.g., Crawford and Sobel 1982). Specifically, the report itself does not affect
either player’s payoffs directly; the set of available reports is independent of the realized
state; and the parties cannot commit to report-contingent contracts. We denote the board’s
information set by ΩB and the resulting investment choice by yB(ΩB). Then,
yB(ΩB) ∈ arg max
y
E{−(y − θ)2 | ΩB}
=

a+ p, if board learns a and p,
a+ E[p], if board only learns a,
E[a | ra] + p, if board only learns p,
E[a | ra] + E[p], if board learns neither a nor p.
(2.3)
We further denote by σ2j , j = A,P, the prior variance of a or p, which, by (2.1) and
(2.2), represents the expected information loss if a decision is made without any knowl-
edge of the realizations of the respective random variables. Similarly, σ2A(b), to be spec-
ified below, denotes the expected information loss regarding a conditional on receiving a
message ra, in case board monitoring has failed to uncover a.11 Since the board learns a
with probability qa(x) and p with probability qp(x), we can state the board’s (and hence the
11The information losses with and without reporting are also functions of A or P , respectively. To avoid
clutter, we suppress this dependency whenever there is no risk of confusion.
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shareholders’) expected payoff under centralization as follows:
piC = −{qa(x)(1− qp(x))σ2P + (1− qa(x)) [qp(x)σ2A(b) + (1− qp(x))(σ2A(b) + σ2P )]}
= − [(1− qp(x))σ2P + (1− qa(x))σ2A(b)]
≡ −V arC(x, b), (2.4)
where V arC denotes the residual variance (with cheap talk) under centralization.
Consider now the case of delegation. If the board learns a, it would be implausible to
assume that the CEO can act according to his bias. Instead, the board then intervenes selec-
tively by forcing the CEO’s hand toward the investment level which maximizes shareholder
value, yB.12 Only if the board does not learn a, the CEO has real decision-making authority
and chooses y in accordance with (2.2), given his available information set, ΩCEO:
yCEO(ΩCEO) =

a+ p, if board learns a and p ,
a+ E[p], if board only learns a ,
a+ E[p | rp] + b, if board only learns p,
a+ E[p] + b, if board learns neither a nor p.
(2.5)
The first two cases of (2.5) effectively replicate those of (2.3) for the case of successful
monitoring. If board monitoring was unsuccessful (the board has not learned a), then with
probability qp the CEO can incorporate into the investment decision a noisy cheap-talk
12For instance, the board could make use of an implicit (off-equilibrium) threat of dismissal.
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report, rp, sent by the informed board. Denoting by σ2P (b) the expected information loss
regarding p conditional on this report, the board’s expected utility under delegation reads:
piD = −{qa(x)(1− qp(x))σ2P + (1− qa(x)) [qp(x)(σ2P (b) + b2) + (1− qp(x))(σ2P + b2)]}
= − [(1− qp(x))σ2P + (1− qa(x))qp(x)σ2P (b)]− (1− qa(x))b2
≡ −V arD(x, b)− (1− qa(x))b2, (2.6)
where V arD denotes the residual variance under delegation. Delegation imposes an addi-
tional bias cost on the shareholders: with probability (1 − qa) the CEO retains effective
control over the investment decision and overinvests.
Now consider the CEO’s payoff under the respective regimes. All else equal, the CEO,
too, aims to minimize the residual variance. At the same time, he has a preference for being
in control (subject to the threat of selective intervention):13
piCCEO = pi
C − b2 and piDCEO = piD + [1− 2qa(x)]b2. (2.7)
Comparing (2.7) with (2.4) and (2.6) yields the following observation (stated without for-
mal proof):
Lemma 2 Conditional on centralization the CEO prefers the same board composition as
the shareholders, whereas conditional on delegation the CEO prefers a lower x than the
13It is easy to show that piC , piCCEO and pi
D, respectively, each are concave in x. The same however does
not necessarily hold for piDCEO.
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shareholders. Furthermore, if the board prefers delegation for some A,P, b, and x, then a
fortiori so does the CEO.








C > piD. Moreover, in line with conven-
tional wisdom, we find that the CEO indeed always prefers (weakly, at least) a less monitor-
heavy board than the shareholders, holding constant the allocation of decision rights. Under
centralization, the board is in control with probability one. Hence, the board composition
only affects the residual variance and both parties agree on the variance-minimizing level
of x. Under delegation, x not only affects the variance (which, again, both parties prefer
to be small) but also the probability of selective intervention. Specifically, the greater is
x, the more likely board monitoring will succeed, and thus the more likely the investment
decision will ultimately reflect the shareholders’ preferences.
2.2.2 Communication Equilibrium
We now briefly describe the communication equilibria and characterize the expected in-
formation loss terms σ2A(b) and σ
2
P (b). In a general cheap-talk game, a sender remits a
(possibly noisy) signal to a receiver, who then updates his belief according to Bayes’ rule
and makes a decision. As shown by Crawford and Sobel (1982), all equilibria of this com-
munication game are characterized by a partitioning of the signal space, where the sender
only specifies which partition the true realized state of nature belongs to. In line with earlier
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studies, we select as our focal equilibrium the most informative one—i.e., the one with the
finest feasible partitioning—because it Pareto dominates all other equilibria.14
We compute the equilibrium using the Crawford and Sobel (1982) approach. Under
centralization, if the board does not observe a, it will form its beliefs about a based on the





b2((N(A, b))2 − 1)
3
,
where N(A, b) is the maximum number of equilibrium partitions under centralization (see
“Preliminaries” in the Appendix for details). The expected information loss σ2P (b) under
delegation is computed analogously.15
2.3 Board Composition and Allocation of Decision Rights
Before addressing the complete model, it is useful to decompose it as follows. We first
investigate the optimal allocation of decision rights for a given board composition and
then, conversely, the optimal board composition holding constant decision rights. We later
14The most informative equilibrium is also supported by the NITS (“No Incentive to Separate”) refinement
proposed by Chen, Kartik, and Sobel (2008). Note however, as pointed out in Melumad and Shibano (1991),
the most informative equilibrium may not be the Pareto-dominant one when the sender’s bias depends on his
private information.
15It is readily verified that both σ2A(·) and σ2P (·) are increasing in b everywhere. Moreover, σ2A(·) and
σ2P (·) are continuous in b, even at those points where N(A, b) and N(P, b) change in a discrete fashion (of
course, σ2A(·) and σ2P (·) are not differentiable at those thresholds).
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synthesize the insights from this preliminary analysis and solve for the optimal endogenous
choice of both design variables.
2.3.1 Exogenous Board Composition
We begin by studying the effect of agency problems on the allocation of decision rights,
taking as given for now the board composition, x. The profit differential between delegation
and centralization as a function of board composition and CEO bias is:
piD(x, b)− piC(x, b) = [1− qa(x)] {σ2A(b)− [b2 + qp(x)σ2P (b)]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Z(x,b)
. (2.8)
Because of selective intervention in case of successful monitoring, only if monitoring fails
to uncover a there will be a difference between the two regimes. This differential cost is
expressed by the function Z(·) in (2.8). Specifically, under centralization the sharehold-
ers incur an information loss due to noisy reporting of a by the CEO; under delegation
they incur a bias cost and an information loss due to the noisy communication of p (with
probability qp).
Lemma 3 When the CEO’s bias, b, is sufficiently small, delegation dominates centraliza-
tion for any x ∈ [0, 1]. When b is sufficiently large, centralization dominates delegation for
any x ∈ [0, 1]. For intermediate values of b, there exists a cutoff xˆ(b) ∈ (0, 1) such that the
shareholders prefer centralization for x ≤ xˆ(b), and delegation for x > xˆ(b).
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Proof. All proofs are found in the Appendix.
Extending the results in Dessein (2002) and Harris and Raviv (2005), if the CEO’s
bias, b, is sufficiently small, Z(x, b) > 0 for all x; the reverse holds for b sufficiently
large. The novel insight of Lemma 3 revolves around intermediate values of b. For these
values we show that monitor-heavy boards call for delegation, and advisor-heavy boards
call for centralization. More precisely, the board is indifferent between centralization and
delegation for some cutoff level of board composition, xˆ(b) ∈ (0, 1), at which
piD(xˆ(b), b) ≡ piC(xˆ(b), b), (2.9)
it prefers to centralize for x ≤ xˆ(b) and to delegate for x > xˆ(b).16 The reason for this
is that advisor-heavy boards are more likely to discover p, and this information is more
valuable under centralization. To illustrate, suppose the board has discovered p. Under
centralization, p will always be perfectly impounded in the board’s choice of yB. Under
delegation, when monitoring fails to uncover a, yCEO will only reflect the noisy report
about p submitted by the board. Hence, delegation suffers from an information loss regard-
ing p.17
16We assume without loss of generality that, whenever the board is indifferent between centralization and
delegation, it will choose centralization.
17Note that Lemma 3 also applies to the special case where A = P . This contrasts with the results in
Harris and Raviv (2005); in their model centralization is always preferred for A = P because the board
always observes p. Then for A = P , the information loss under centralization due to a noisy report of a is
the same as that under delegation given the noisy report of p; yet the board also incurs the bias cost under
delegation. In our model, the board observes p with probability qp(x) < 1, so the information loss due to
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Closely related, Baker and Gompers’s (2003) study venture capitalist representation
on boards. They conclude that VCs mostly substitute for advisory board members, when
mapped into our taxonomy. Consistent with Lemma 3, they find that boards with greater
VC representation are more actively involved in decision-making.
2.3.2 Exogenous Allocation of Decision Rights
We now analyze the optimal board composition for given CEO bias, taking decision rights
as given. Specifically, we aim to compare xC(b) and xD(b), where xS(b) ∈ arg maxx piS(x, b), S =
C,D. To that end, it is helpful to assess the values to the shareholders of learning a and
p, respectively, under centralization and delegation. As argued above, the value of learning
p is greater under centralization, which calls for more monitoring under delegation. Now
consider the value of learning a under the respective modes. The benefit from learning
a is the avoided information loss σ2A(b) under centralization, whereas under delegation it
comprises both the avoided bias cost b2 and the avoided information loss σ2P (b) (with prob-
ability qp). (Recall that delegation is subject to selective intervention contingent on the
board learning a.) For high values of b the benefit from learning a is greater under delega-
tion (i.e., Z(·) < 0 in (2.8)). This reinforces the above value-of-learning-p effect in that it
also calls for more monitoring under delegation. Formally:
Lemma 4 For b sufficiently high, xD(b) > xC(b).
noisy communication is lower under delegation than under centralization. Thus, in our setting, delegation is
preferred for b sufficiently small even when A = P .
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Now consider the case where b and P are small relative to A. In that case Z(·) > 0
in (2.8) and the benefit to the shareholders from learning a is higher under centralization.
Since now the values of learning a and p each are greater under centralization, the net effect
on the optimal board composition is not immediately obvious. To evaluate this tradeoff,
additional structure on the technology is needed:18
Lemma 5 Suppose A = P, qa(x) = ηxz, qp(x) = η(1 − x)z, where η ∈ (0, 1) and
z ∈ (0, 1). Then, for η sufficiently large, xD(b) > xC(b) holds for any b.
Given the additional structure, the value-of-learning-p effect is the dominant force, imply-
ing that less centralized firms nominate more monitors to the board for any level of CEO
bias.
The primary benefit of board monitoring is to mitigate the inefficiencies arising from
biased decision-making (under delegation) or noisy reporting (under centralization). Con-
sequently, one would expect the optimal monitoring intensity to go up as b increases. The
next result confirms this intuition, holding fixed again the allocation of decision rights.
Lemma 6 xS(b) is non-decreasing in b, for given S = C,D.
This result follows directly from the fact that piS, S = C,D, has increasing differences
in x and b, because the respective information losses with regard to a and p each are non-
decreasing in b. Therefore, the more biased is the CEO, the more important it is for the
18The exponential technology in Lemma 5 is also used for the running example in some of the figures
below.
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board to uncover what the CEO knows, regardless of the allocation of decision rights.
Conversely, if b is small, there is little value to monitoring; instead the board should devote
all of its resources to advising.
In sum, our preliminary analysis has shown that greater CEO bias directly calls for
more centralization and more monitoring. However, there is a confounding effect in that
more centralization calls for more advising. To derive empirical predictions on the link
between CEO bias and board composition, we now turn to the full-fledged model where all
design choices are endogenous.
2.4 Equilibrium Choice of Board Composition and Deci-
sion Rights
We now consider the board’s simultaneous choice of x and S as a function of the economic
environment of the firm. While in practice the board nomination process often precedes
the assigning of decision rights, it is without loss of generality in our base model to treat
those two choices as simultaneous. With an eye on the extant empirical literature, which
has focused on the severity of agency problems, we let the bias parameter b vary while
keeping the uncertainty parameters (A,P ) fixed. The sequence of events is summarized in
Figure 2.1:












Figure 2.1: Timeline I—Shareholders/board choose x and S
choose both S and x. Since S is a discrete choice variable, the shareholders’ problem
can be decomposed as follows. First, for any allocation of decision rights, S, find the
optimal board composition, xS(b), as characterized in Section 2.3.2. Then, pick S = C,
if piC(xC(b), b) > piD(xD(b), b), and S = D otherwise. For notational convenience we
introduce the indicator variable 1D ∈ {0, 1}, where 1D = 1 indicates delegation, and
1D = 0 indicates centralization. The shareholders’ optimization problem at Date 2 can
then be stated as follows:
P0 : max
1D∈{0,1}
(1− 1D)piC(xC(b), b) + 1DpiD(xD(b), b), for any b.
Denote the solution to this program by (S∗(b), x∗(b)) where x∗(b) = xS∗(b)(b).
Our first main result characterizes the solution to the shareholders’ optimization prob-
lem, P0.
Proposition 4 (Timeline I)
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(i) For sufficiently small levels of CEO bias, b, the shareholders choose delegation, i.e.,
S∗(b) = D, and board composition x∗(b) = xD(b).
(ii) For b sufficiently large, the shareholders choose centralization, i.e., S∗(b) = C, and
x∗(b) = xC(b).
(iii) There exists at least one cutoff bˆ at which the optimal allocation of decision rights
switches from delegation to centralization.
The fraction of monitoring types on the board, x∗(b), is non-decreasing in b almost every-
where, except at such cutoffs, bˆ, where limε→0 x∗(bˆ − ε) = limε→0 xD(bˆ − ε) > xˆ(bˆ) >
limε→0 x∗(bˆ+ ε) = limε→0 xC(bˆ+ ε).
Consistent with earlier studies, the more biased is the CEO, the more likely the board
will centralize the decision-making. The last part of the proposition is more surprising
as it shows that the optimal board composition is non-monotonic in the CEO’s bias, b.
Starting from small levels of b, the firm optimally delegates authority to the CEO and
mostly engages in advising the latter (low x). As b increases, by Lemma 6, xD, too, will
increase. When the CEO’s bias reaches the threshold bˆ, defined by
piD(xD(bˆ), bˆ) ≡ piC(xC(bˆ), bˆ), (2.10)
the board is indifferent as to who makes the decision and hence switches to centralization.19
19As suggested by Proposition 4, there may be more than one such threshold bˆ at which the optimal
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Figure 2.2: Board composition as a function of CEO bias under Timeline I
For this figure, qa(x) and qp(x) take the exponential function form as in Lemma 5. The
parameter values are A = P = 2, η = 0.8, z = 0.5.
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Centralization in turn creates greater demand for advisors because, as argued above, the
value of learning p is higher than under delegation — thus the discrete downward jump in
x∗(b) at bˆ (see Figure 2.2).20
Our result has empirical implications regarding the life cycle of firms. As firms mature,
agency problems (as measured by b) tend to increase, and therefore one would expect to
see more monitor-heavy boards (e.g., Lehn et al. 2004). However, if tests do not control for
the allocation of decision rights, this general trend may be obscured in the data due to an
omitted correlated variable problem. Consider two firms that operate in similar industries
and use comparable technologies (i.e., have roughly similar As and P s), but one is more
mature and hence plagued by more severe agency problems than the other. The more
mature firm may well have fewer monitors on the board as a result of it having centralized
more decision-making authority at the board level.
2.5 CEO Power I: Influence Over Board Composition
Critics of corporate governance practice have argued that a key reason why boards exert in-
sufficient control over management is that CEOs often have significant say over the board
selection process. This issue was studied analytically by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)
allocation of decision rights changes. This is due to the fact that piC(xC(b), b) and piD(xD(b), b) may intersect
more than once, see also Harris and Raviv (2005). To abstract from such technicalities and focus on the
main economic tensions, we will henceforth only consider scenarios where such a threshold is unique. The
threshold can be shown to be unique for plausible restrictions on the primitives of the model.
20Using the terminology developed in connection with Lemmas 4 and 5, the threshold value bˆ is large
















Figure 2.3: Timeline II—CEO influences board composition
(see Shivdasani and Yermack 1999 for empirical evidence). In their model the CEO’s
bargaining power over board composition evolves dynamically as a result of delivered per-
formance. To address the issue of CEO power—and how it affects the benchmark model
of the preceding section—we now consider a modified scenario where the CEO himself
chooses the board composition, x, followed by the board allocating the decision rights, S.
(Legally, of course, it is up to the shareholders to choose the board; however, a recurring
theme in the practitioners’ literature is that CEOs can influence the board composition —
we simply push this notion to the extreme.) We maintain the earlier assumption that the
board, even if selected by the CEO, acts in the shareholders’ interest when choosing S.21
In the Concluding Remarks section, below, we speculate on the possible consequences of
biased boards.
The question of interest is how the CEO’s preferred board composition differs from that
21An implicit assumption is that there is a binding limit on the number of insiders on the board. In that
case, a powerful CEO can only pick from outsiders whose objective is to maximize shareholder value. But
the CEO may prefer a monitor/advisor mix that diverges from that preferred by the shareholders.
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the shareholders would choose if they were in control. A key concern in the practitioners’
literature is that a powerful CEO prefers less board monitoring. Holding constant the al-
location of decision rights, Lemma 0 has confirmed this intuition. As we will show now,
however, this intuition may not always hold if decision rights are assigned in a sequentially
rational fashion. Instead, the CEO sometimes prefers more monitors on the board than the
shareholders do.




[1− 1D(x, b)]piCCEO(x, b) + 1D(x, b)piDCEO(x, b), for any b,
subject to:
1D(x, b) ∈ arg max
1D∈{0,1}
(1− 1D)piC(x, b) + 1DpiD(x, b).
The CEO maximizes his expected payoff subject to the constraint that the board will sub-
sequently allocate decision rights in a sequentially rational fashion. Denote the solution to
this program by xCEO(b). Our next result compares xCEO(b) with the board composition,
x∗(b), selected by the shareholders in the benchmark model as of Proposition 4. (Recall that
bˆ denotes the threshold bias value at which a shareholder-nominated board under Timeline
I is indifferent between centralizing and delegating, as of (2.10).)
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Proposition 5 (Timeline II) Suppose the CEO chooses the board composition, x, before
the board allocates the decision rights, S. Then:
(i) For b < bˆ, xCEO(b) < x∗(b) and S(xCEO(b), b) = S∗(b) = D.
(ii) For b sufficiently large, xCEO(b) = x∗(b) and S(xCEO(b), b) = S∗(b) = C.
(iii) For b = bˆ + ε with ε → 0, xCEO(b) > x∗(b) and S(xCEO(b), b) = D whereas
S∗(b) = C.
The key to understanding the first part of the result is Lemma 0. On the one hand, that
earlier result has shown that whenever the board prefers delegation in the benchmark model
of Section 2.4, then a fortiori so does the CEO. (The CEO could simply set xCEO(b) =
xD(b) to induce delegation and act according to his bias.22) Secondly, Lemma 0 has shown
that, under delegation, the CEO prefers a lower level of monitoring than the shareholders,
as that would reduce qa(x), the probability of selective intervention. For b < bˆ, delegation
is preferred even by the board in the benchmark model; thus the CEO has no incentive to
influence the board’s decision and simply sets xCEO(b) < x∗(b) = xD(b). On the other
hand, for very severe agency problems (part (ii)) the board chooses centralization even if
composed entirely of monitors.23 Therefore, the CEO sets xCEO(b) = x∗(b) = xC(b)
22As we show in the Appendix, for b < bˆ, xD(b) > xˆ(b). Hence, if the CEO were to (suboptimally) choose
xD(b), the board would delegate the decision, as desired by the CEO.
23Technically, the critical value xˆ(b) at which the board is indifferent to delegate the investment decision
would exceed one.
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because, conditional on centralization, Lemma 0 has shown that the players’ preferences
over board composition coincide.
The main insight of Proposition 5 is that, in certain cases, the CEO prefers excessive
board monitoring (part (iii) of Proposition 5; see Figure 2.4). When the optimal solution
in the benchmark model of Program P0 is such that the shareholders marginally prefer
centralization over delegation (i.e., b exceeds but is close to bˆ), then the CEO has incentives
to influence the board toward delegating the decision by nominating more monitors to the
board. Put succinctly, the CEO prefers delegation — even if subject to the threat of selective
intervention by a vigilant board — rather than having control taken away by an advisor-
heavy (activist) board.
The past decade has seen a number of regulatory attempts at strengthening the mon-
itoring role of boards, e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) with its focus on the
audit committee (see SOX, Section 301). In the context of our model, we interpret such
a regulation as a rule stipulating a lower bound on x, i.e., x ≥ x.24 Clearly, as long as
shareholders determine the board composition, any regulatory intervention of this sort will
necessarily (weakly) lower the shareholders’ payoff.25 However, with a powerful CEO, a
welfare-increasing role for regulation may arise because, as Proposition 5 has shown, the
CEO’s choice of x tends to diverge from that preferred by the shareholders.
24One of the main objectives of SOX is to increase board independence. As explained in the Introduction,
there is no clear mapping between independence and our advisor/monitor dichotomy. However, Linck et
al. (2009) and Faleye et al. (2010) document a significant shift in favor of monitoring types post-SOX. Section
407 of SOX specifically requires that the audit committee includes at least one qualified financial expert.




Figure 2.4: Board composition as a function of CEO bias under Timeline II
The dashed line is the optimal board composition under the benchmark model of Timeline
I. For this figure, qa(x) and qp(x) take the exponential function form as in Lemma 5. The
parameter values are the same as in Figure 2.2, i.e., A = P = 2, η = 0.8, z = 0.5.
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Corollary 3 Suppose the CEO chooses the board composition as in Timeline II. Imposing
a constraint that x ≥ x (weakly) lowers shareholder value if and only if b > bˆ, and strictly
so if this constraint is binding in that xCEO(b) < x.
A necessary condition for such regulations to increase social welfare is that agency
problems must be sufficiently small, i.e., b < bˆ. Only in that case the conventional wisdom
applies that the CEO prefers a “monitor-light” boards, so that constraining his choice of
x from below may indeed improve shareholder value. However, for greater biases, im-
posing such a constraint can only result in a board composition that departs even further
from the benchmark solution. Hence, somewhat ironically, regulations intended to miti-
gate incentive costs arising from CEO bias and power may be harmful in precisely those
circumstances where agency problems are severe.
Stepping outside the scope of our model, Corollary 3 is consistent with the recent trend
of increasing board sizes after SOX (Linck et al 2008, 2009). If firms have composed their
boards optimally pre-SOX, and then face an exogenous shock forcing them to add more
monitors to the board, one would in fact expect to see board size to grow as firms aim to
re-balance the board composition.
2.6 CEO Power II: Entrenchment
A somewhat more subtle way in which managers can exert power and obtain de facto
authority is by choosing investment projects that confer them a greater degree of private
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information (Shleifer and Vishny 1989, Edlin and Stiglitz 1995). In this section, we build
on the discussion in Harris and Raviv (2005) on “strategic choice of information advantage”
and embed it in our model with endogenous board composition. We return to our initial
assumption that it is the shareholders, not the CEO, who control the board nomination
process.
Suppose the CEO can choose the level of “complexity” of the project endogenously.
Specifically, a remains uniformly distributed over [0, A], but we now assume the CEO can
freely choose the upper bound A within some range [A, A¯]. This choice is assumed to be
observable but not contractible.26 In the following, for given “default complexity” A, we
interpret A¯ as a measure of the CEO’s discretion. While we assume that increasing project
complexity comes at no direct cost to the CEO, our model can easily be extended to include
such costs.
We first address the case where the CEO chooses the level of complexity before the
shareholders assemble the board and allocate decision rights (Section 2.6.1). In this set-
ting, A corresponds to a long-term strategy choice whose consequences outlast the tenure
of a typical director. Alternatively, it may describe a situation where the CEO of a company
opts for a certain technology before a new (non-staggered) board is assembled. In Section
2.6.2, we consider a more short-term notion of project complexity. In that case, the share-
26To illustrate the observability assumption, consider the following example (Business Week, January 25,
2006, “Daimler Shakeup: Realignment in the Auto Industry”). Jurgen Schrempp, former CEO of Daim-
lerChrysler, pursued a strategy of growth and diversification. His successor, Dieter Zetsche, reverted to the
traditional strategy of a more focused car maker. In the context of our model, Schrempp’s strategy can be















Figure 2.5: Timeline III—CEO chooses A endogenously
holders can assemble the board before the CEO’s choice of A. The board composition then
potentially plays a strategic role in deterring CEO entrenchment.
2.6.1 Endogenous Project Complexity
Consider the revised sequence of events as depicted in Timeline III.
When allocating decision rights at Date 3, the board trades off the information loss
regarding a under centralization with the information loss regarding p plus the bias cost
under delegation, as in (2.8). As the information advantage of the CEO becomes larger
(i.e., as A increases), the board’s willingness to delegate to the CEO increases, as noted
by Harris and Raviv (2005). Clearly, the CEO will want to “noise up” the project only if
absent such action the board would choose to centralize, i.e., if b ≥ bˆ(A). In this case, there
exists a threshold Aˆ(b) given by
piC(xC(Aˆ(b), b), Aˆ(b), b) ≡ piD(xD(b), b), (2.11)
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such that the board prefers to delegate the investment decision for any A > Aˆ(b), and
to centralize otherwise. Under delegation, neither party’s payoff depends on the project
complexity A, because the realization of a will always be impounded without noise in the
investment decision. In other words, a more complex project (a higher A) adversely affects
the payoff of either party only under centralization.
If by choosing A > Aˆ(b) the CEO succeeds in influencing the board’s decision towards
delegation, no additional information loss regarding a will be incurred by either party. On
the other hand, if the equilibrium path is such that the investment will be made by the
board at Date 3, then the CEO’s and the board’s objectives regarding project complexity
are aligned in that both prefer the least complex project, A, at Date 2. We assume without
loss of generality that, whenever the CEO is indifferent among various levels of A, he will
choose the lowest one.27
The following observation describes the circumstances under which CEO entrenchment
will occur:
Observation 1 [Timeline III] Suppose the CEO chooses project complexity A before the
shareholders/board choose S and x. Then:
(i) For any b < bˆ(A), the CEO chooses A = A, followed by the board delegating the
investment decision and setting x = xD(b).
27This would be the equilibrium choice in a more general model where (i) the CEO observes A with
probability less than one or (ii) the CEO incurs personal costs of increasing the project complexity.
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(ii) For any b ∈ [bˆ(A), b∗), where b∗ ≤ bˆ(A¯), the CEO chooses A = Aˆ(b) + ε, ε → 0,
followed by the board delegating the investment decision and setting x = xD(b).
(iii) For any b ≥ bˆ(A¯), the CEO chooses A = A, followed by the board centralizing the
investment decision and setting x = xC(A, b).
For negligible agency problems (part (i)), there is no need for the CEO to entrench him-
self, as the board is willing to delegate even for the default complexity, A. For intermediate
levels of agency conflicts (part (ii)), it is both feasible and profitable for the CEO to en-
trench himself.28 However, for sufficiently severe agency problems (part (iii)), the board is
so strongly inclined to centralize that the level of complexity required to trigger delegation
exceeds the maximum complexity. Entrenchment then is not feasible. Instead, the CEO
will choose the least complex project, A, as that will maximize his own payoff conditional
on centralization (see Figure 2.6 for illustration).
As argued above, if delegation obtains along the equilibrium path, then increased project
complexity is without informational costs to all players. However, if an investment deci-
sion is delegated which absent entrenchment would have been centralized, the shareholders
incur additional bias costs. We close our analysis by asking, if and how shareholders can
28To determine whether entrenchment is optimal for the CEO, provided it is feasible, define g(b) ≡
piDCEO(x
D(b), b) − piCCEO(xC(A, b), A, b), and b∗∗ such that g(b∗∗) ≡ 0. It is easy to show that if b∗∗
exists, then b∗∗ > bˆ(A). The reason is that for any b ≤ bˆ(A), the board (weakly) prefers delegation, which
by (2.7) is then also the preferred choice for the CEO. Since g(b) is continuous and positive for b ≤ bˆ(A)
and for b → ∞, it follows that either no b∗∗ exists or an even number of b∗∗ exist. The cutoff in part (ii) of
Observation 1 follows as b∗ = min{bˆ(A¯),min b∗∗}.
79
           
          
Delegation Centralization 
AA  
0.17)A(bˆ  0.97)A(bˆ  
ˆ ( )A A b  ! "AA  
Figure 2.6: Board composition as a function of CEO bias under Timeline III
For this figure, qa(x) and qp(x) take the exponential function form as in Lemma 5. The


















Figure 2.7: Shareholders may preempt CEO entrenchment
protect themselves against entrenchment by assembling the board in a strategic fashion at
the outset.
2.6.2 Preempting CEO Entrenchment
Board composition in practice is fairly sticky in that board members serve for multiple
years. Hence, when considering an entrenchment strategy, a CEO often has to take the
existing board as given. Shareholders, in turn, when nominating the board, need to be cog-
nizant of the threat of entrenchment. We now consider the sequence of events depicted in
Timeline IV where the shareholders first assemble the board, followed by the CEO choos-
ing the project complexity, and finally, the board deciding whether to delegate.
The board composition now takes on a strategic role in that it may influence the CEO’s
subsequent choice of project complexity. Put differently, the shareholders may want to
deviate from the board composition that optimally balances the advisory and monitoring
roles (as described in Proposition 4) so as to preempt CEO entrenchment.
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To ensure that entrenchment is a meaningful threat, the following assumption is main-
tained throughout this section:
Assumption 1 b ∈ [bˆ(A), bˆ(A¯)].
This assumption postulates that absent CEO entrenchment the board would centralize the
decision (because b ≥ bˆ(A)). At the same time, it is feasible for the CEO to entrench
himself (because b ≤ bˆ(A¯) is equivalent to Aˆ(b) ≤ A¯).29
The shareholders may now be able to preempt CEO entrenchment by nominating an
advisor-heavy board (i.e., a low level of x) at Date 2 as a way to commit to centralization
at Date 4 in Timeline IV. Recall from Lemma 3 that advisor-heavy boards and centraliza-
tion are complements. Denote by A˜(x, b) the level of project complexity that leaves the
board indifferent between centralizing and delegating for given levels of bias and board
composition (Timeline IV):
piC(x, A˜(x, b), b) ≡ piD(x, b). (2.12)
Using the same logic as in Section 2.6.1, A˜(x, b) is decreasing in x: the more advisor-
heavy the board, the less it is willing to delegate — a greater level of project complexity
is thus required for the CEO to gain control. By setting x below xˆ(A¯, b) — generalizing
29Assumption 1 postulates that, relative to the admissible range of bias parameters b, the CEO’s discretion
as measured by A¯ must be sufficiently large. Lemma 7, below, invokes this assumption, yet considers the
case of “small” CEO discretion. For this case to be compatible with Assumption 1, the range of b has to be
correspondingly small.
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the definition in (2.9) to allow for A to vary30 — the shareholders can credibly commit the
board to centralize for any feasible level of project complexity. Even if the CEO were to
choose the most complex project, A¯, a sufficiently advisor-heavy board would value new
information enough so as to ensure centralization. The CEO, anticipating centralization
along the equilibrium path, then will refrain from entrenching himself.
The shareholders’ decision problem at Date 2 essentially boils down to a discrete profit
comparison between two alternative courses of action:
(i) to preempt CEO entrenchment by setting x ≤ xˆ(A¯, b), or
(ii) to acquiesce to CEO entrenchment and adapt x optimally to the fact that, along the
equilibrium path, the investment decision will be delegated.
More formally, this discrete choice for the shareholders can be expressed by comparing the
values of the following two optimization programs:




subject to: A˜(x, b) ≥ A¯ (equivalently, x ≤ xˆ(A¯, b)). (C)
30In Section 2.3.1 we suppressed the functional dependance of xˆ(·) on A and P . Since we now allow for
A to vary, we explicitly write xˆ(·) as a function of A and b.
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subject to: A˜(x, b) < A¯ (equivalently, x > xˆ(A¯, b)). (D)
If entrenchment is preempted in equilibrium (Program PC), the CEO chooses the default
complexity level A at Date 3, because greater complexity would merely add to the infor-
mational loss without yielding any offsetting benefits.
By definition of bˆ(A), the board is indifferent between centralization and delegation for
b = bˆ(A) and strictly prefers centralization for any b > bˆ(A), given A = A. Thus, if both
constraints (C) and (D) in the respective optimization programs were slack, the analysis
would revert to the benchmark setting of Timeline I, above. In that case, for any b ≥ bˆ(A),
the value of PC would exceed that of PD; hence the board would prefer centralization given
Assumption 1. As a result, a necessary condition for delegation to obtain in equilibrium is
that constraint (C) has to be binding. More generally, the shadow prices of the constraints
(C) and (D) indicate whether there is a cost to the shareholders associated with the threat
of CEO entrenchment under the respective organizational modes.
Lemma 7 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then:
(i) Constraint (D) in program PD is always slack.
(ii) For A¯ sufficiently small, constraint (C) in program PC is always slack. For A¯ suf-
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ficiently large, constraint (C) is binding at b = bˆ(A) and there exists at least one
bC ∈ [bˆ(A), bˆ(A¯)] such that (C) holds with equality at bC , i.e., xC(A, bC) = xˆ(A¯, bC).
To illustrate part (i), suppose the shareholders, anticipating delegation along the equi-
librium path, choose the benchmark board composition xD(b), as of Timeline I. Then, by
Assumption 1, the CEO can always choose a level of project complexity that induces the
board at Date 4 to delegate conditional on xD(b). Hence, constraint (D) in the “Acquiesce”
program PD is always slack and the shareholders’ Date-1 choice of xD(b) then would in-
deed be optimal. This follows naturally from the fact that the CEO values being in control.
Now consider the “Preempt” program PC (part (ii) of Lemma 7). Suppose the share-
holders anticipate that the decision will be centralized at Date 4. Absent the threat of
entrenchment, they would then prefer the board composition xC(A, b). The question is
whether this board composition is sufficiently advisor-heavy to preempt entrenchment. If
the CEO has limited discretion in that A¯ − A is sufficiently small, the answer is yes for
any admissible level of b satisfying Assumption 1. However, if the CEO has significant
discretion, then the answer will depend on his bias parameter. If b is small, the CEO can
implement a project sufficiently complex so as to violate constraint (C) if the shareholders
were to choose xC(A, b). This follows from the fact that high discretion and low bias both
predispose the board towards delegating. For high b, on the other hand, the board prefers
to centralize at Date 4, even if the CEO were to choose A¯. In that case, constraint (C) will
be slack at xC(A, b).
85
In summary, CEO entrenchment is never a credible threat if the CEO has little discre-
tion, i.e., if A¯ is small. This implies the following:
Observation 2 (Timeline IV) [Preempt at no cost] Suppose Assumption 1 holds and the
shareholders choose x before the CEO chooses A ∈ [A, A¯]. For A¯ sufficiently small, the
shareholders choose x = xC(A, b) at Date 2, the CEO chooses A = A at Date 3, and the
board centralizes the decision at Date 4.
On the other hand, if the CEO enjoys significant discretion, by Lemma 7, the share-
holders face the following tradeoff: Absent CEO entrenchment they would prefer central-
ization; yet centralization may be subject to entrenchment—i.e., a positive shadow cost
of constraint (C)—whereas delegation is immune to entrenchment. We now evaluate this
tradeoff by asking whether it is optimal (or even feasible) for the shareholders to preempt
entrenchment.31 (Recall that constraint (C) in PC is binding for b < bC .)
Proposition 6 (Timeline IV) Suppose Assumption 1 holds and the shareholders choose x
before the CEO chooses A ∈ [A, A¯]. Then, for A¯ sufficiently large:
(i) [Acquiesce] If b = bˆ(A)+δ, with δ “small”, then the shareholders choose x = xD(b)
at Date 2, the CEO chooses A = A˜(xD(b), b) + ε > A at Date 3, and the board
delegates the decision at Date 4.
(ii) [Preempt at a cost] If b = bC − δ, with δ “small”, then the shareholders choose
31If there exist multiple thresholds bC ∈ [bˆ(A), bˆ(A¯)], as defined in Lemma 7, we will focus on the smallest
one.
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x = xˆ(A¯, b) at Date 2, the CEO chooses A = A at Date 3, and the board centralizes
the decision at Date 4.
(iii) [Preempt at no cost] If b = bC + δ, with δ “small”, then the shareholders choose
x = xC(A, b) at Date 2, the CEO choosesA = A at Date 3, and the board centralizes
the decision at Date 4.
Suppose the CEO has significant discretion in his project choice. Then, to commit to
centralization (if feasible), the shareholders would have to deviate from the benchmark
board composition, xC(A, b). If the shareholders are only marginally predisposed to cen-
tralizing absent CEO entrenchment (i.e., for b = bˆ(A) + δ), it is not worthwhile for them to
do so and bear the attendant shadow price of constraint (C). Instead, they acquiesce to the
CEO’s entrenchment threat by choosing x = xD(b).
However, as the CEO’s bias increases further, then in the benchmark setting of Timeline
I (without the threat of CEO entrenchment) the shareholders’ preference for centralization
becomes more pronounced. At the same time, as the bias approaches bC , the shadow
price of constraint (C) under centralization vanishes. The shareholders then are better off
preempting entrenchment by deviating from xC(·). By strategically adding more advisors
to the board, the shareholders effectively commit to centralization. This deviation from the
benchmark case of Timeline I is less costly than the additional bias cost that would result
from acquiescing to CEO entrenchment (as under Timeline III).
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Figure 2.8: Board composition as a function of CEO bias under Timeline IV
For this figure, qa(x) and qp(x) take the exponential function form as in Lemma 5. The
parameter values are the same as in Figure 2.6, i.e., A = P = 2, A¯ = 3.5, η = 0.8,
z = 0.5.
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disposed to centralize that constraint (C) becomes slack. In other words, even if the CEO
were to choose the maximum project complexity A¯, the board would still find central-
ization the sequentially optimal choice at Date 4 given its prior choice of xC(A, b). The
unconstrained optimal board composition, xC(·), then constitutes a credible commitment
to centralize. As a result, the shareholders can preempt entrenchment at no cost (see Figure
2.8 for illustration).
As argued in connection with Corollary 3, regulatory interventions bounding x from
below can in fact make shareholders worse off by exacerbating distortions in board com-
position if the board is effectively nominated by the CEO. Proposition 6 reveals another
potential downside of such regulations in settings where project complexity is endogenous:
they may jeopardize shareholders’ ability to preempt CEO entrenchment.
Taken together, the preceding results show that caution is in order when interpreting
observed patterns of board composition. A given board composition can be consistent
with different severity levels of agency problems, depending on the sequence of events —
specifically, whether there are entrenchment options. For instance, an advisor-heavy board
can indicate negligible agency problems if CEO entrenchment is not an issue (Propositions
4 and 5), or severe agency problems if shareholders need to actively preempt entrenchment
by a highly biased CEO (Proposition 6).
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2.7 Concluding Remarks
Shareholder activists, regulators, and researchers have been increasingly interested in, and
concerned about, CEO power. This paper examines two aspects of CEO power. First, if
a powerful CEO controls the board nomination process, we find, somewhat surprisingly,
that the CEO may in fact appoint a board that is excessively focused on monitoring. Such
a board is less likely to generate incrementally new information, which in turn implies
more delegation. Second, CEOs may entrench themselves by strategically exacerbating
project complexity. Here, we show that when shareholders appoint the board, they some-
times choose a more advisor-heavy board as compared to that chosen in the absence of
entrenchment. In both cases, the board composition serves a strategic purpose, over and
above trading off the monitoring and advising functions, in that it commits other players to
certain actions desired by the party in control of the nomination process.
Our model has explored various sequences of actions chosen by shareholders/boards
and by the CEO, as well as different assumptions regarding the extent to which the parties
can precommit to their actions. There appears to be anecdotal support for all of those
timelines. It would be desirable if future empirical work could shed more light on the
balance of power among the various actors involved in corporate governance.
Throughout the paper we assume that board members internalize the shareholders’
preferences. Despite strict fiduciary duty laws, board members’ preferences may diverge
from those of shareholders, or even differ amongst themselves. An interesting extension
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would be to incorporate divergent preferences into our model. Harris and Raviv (2010)
and Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2009) show that shareholders may sometimes be better off
choosing board members whose preferences over the scale of investment are intermediate
between their own and those of the CEO. Doing so improves communication between CEO
and the board. It is an interesting avenue for future research to investigate how the desir-
ability of biased boards interacts with the board composition along the monitor/advisor




A.1 Formal definition of the equilibrium
I begin by introducing the analyst’s utility at each decision node. To that end, denote by
UJt (mt, st, λt, γ
J) the type J analyst’s utility at period t = 1, 2 when she reportsmt and her
signal is st, reputation is λt and precision is γJ . Specifically, λ1 = λ and λ2 = Λ(m1, w1).
Analyst J’s utility at the information acquisition stage is denoted by UJ0 (γ
J).1
Given the investor’s second period optimal decision rule a2(m2,Λ), type J analyst’s
1To save on notation, I suppress the functional dependence of the players’ utilities and strategies on their
conjectures about their counterparties’ actions.
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second period utility is:
UA2 (m2, s2,Λ, γ
A) = −γA(a2(m2,Λ)− s2)2 − (1− γA)[a2(m2,Λ)− (1− s2)]2,
UM2 (m2, s2,Λ, γ
M) = −(a2(m2,Λ)− 1)2.
Denote by σJt (st, γ
J , λt) the type J analyst’s optimal communication strategy at period t
upon observing signal st when her precision is γJ and reputation is λt. Then,
σJ2 (s2, γ




2 (1, s2,Λ, γ
J) + (1− σJ2 )UJ2 (0, s2,Λ, γJ).
Hence, type J analyst’s second period expected utility (anticipating that she will commu-
nicate optimally) is2







J ,Λ)UJ2 (1, s2,Λ, γ
J)+(1−σJ2 (s2, γJ ,Λ))UJ2 (0, s2,Λ, γJ)
}
.
Given the investor’s first period optimal decision rule a1(m1, λ), type J analyst’s 1st
2Again, here I suppress the dependence of V J(·) on γ˜.
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period utility is then given by:
UA1 (m1, s1, λ, γ
A) = xA{−γA(a1(m1, λ)− s1)2 − (1− γA)[a1(m1, λ)− (1− s1)]2}
+(1− xA){γAV A(Λ(m1, s1), γA) + (1− γA)V A(Λ(m1, 1− s1), γA)},
UM1 (m1, s1, λ, γ
M) = −xM(a1(m1, λ)− 1)2
+(1− xM){γMV M(Λ(m1, s1), γM) + (1− γM)V M(Λ(m1, 1− s1), γM)}.
Then,
σJ1 (s1, γ




1 (1, s1, λ, γ
J) + (1− σJ1 )UJ1 (0, s1, λ, γJ).









J , λ)UJ1 (1, s1, λ, γ
J)+(1−σJ1 (s1, γJ , λ))UJ1 (0, s1, λ, γJ)
}−C(γJ).
Now I am in a position to define the equilibrium of the game formally.





, σAt (·), σMt (·), at(·),Γt(·),Λ(·)) satisfying the following properties:
(1)
σJt (st, γ




t (1, st, λt, γ





at(mt, λt) ∈ argmax
at∈R







(4) The state and type inference functions, Γ1(m1, λ), Γ2(m2,Λ) and Λ(·), are derived
from the analyst’s equilibrium strategy according to inference rules (1.1) and (1.2).
Specifically,
φJt (1|wt) = γJ
∗
σJt (wt, γ
J∗ , λt) + (1− γJ∗)σJt (1− wt, γJ
∗
, λt).
When the posteriors are undefined according to Bayes rule, I adopt the convention
that the investor sticks to his priors.
The analysis in Section 1.3.1 shows that the analyst’s second period optimal reporting
strategy is independent of her reputation λ2. Furthermore, for the first period, λ1(= λ) is a
constant, hence I drop the argument λt in σJt (·) in the main text.
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A.2 Properties of informative communication in the first
period
For later use, I first extend the insights from Morris (2001) and characterize the properties
of first period informative communication for exogenous analyst’s precision γ = (γA, γM).
Let me introduce the notations under exogenous and commonly known γ = (γA, γM):
σJt (st|γ) is the probability of type J analyst reporting 1 in period t when her signal is st;
at(mt, λt, γ) is the investor’s action in period t when he receives message mt and his belief
of analyst being aligned is λt; Γt(mt, λt, γ) states the investor’s inference of the actual
state being 1 in period t; Λ(m1, w1|γ) is the investor’s belief of the analyst being aligned if
messagem1 is received and statew1 is realized. V J(Λ(·), γA) is the type J analyst’s second
period expected utility when she has reputation Λ(·). Note that V J(·) is independent of γM .
The reason is that the misaligned analyst always reports 1 in the second period and hence
her precision has no effect on the investor’s action.
Write ΠJC(s1|γ) for the net current expected gain to the type J analyst of reporting 1
rather than 0, when she observes signal s1 and the analyst’s precision γ = (γA, γM):3
ΠAC(s1|γ) = −xA{γA(a1(1, γ)− s1)2 + (1− γA)(a1(1, γ)− (1− s1))2}
+xA{γA(a1(0, γ)− s1)2 + (1− γA)(a1(0, γ)− (1− s1))2},
ΠMC (1|γ) = ΠMC (0|γ) = −xM(a1(1, γ)− 1)2 + xM(a1(0, γ)− 1)2. (A.1)
3To save on notation, from now on, I suppress the functional dependance of a1(·) and Γ1(·) on λ.
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Write ΠJR(s1|γ) for the net expected reputational gain to the type J analyst of reporting 0
rather than 1, when she observes signal s1 and the analyst’s precision is γ:
ΠJR(s1|γ) = (1− xJ)γJ [V J(Λ(0, s1|γ), γ)− V J(Λ(1, s1|γ), γ)]
+ (1− xJ)(1− γJ)[V J(Λ(0, 1− s1|γ), γ)− V J(Λ(1, 1− s1|γ), γ)]}.(A 2)
The type J analyst has a strict incentive to report 1 when she observes s1 if and only if
ΠJC(s1|γ) > ΠJR(s1|γ). I refer to ΠJC(·) and ΠJR(·) as the type J analyst’s current reporting
incentive and reputational reporting incentive, respectively.
To save on notation, I suppress the functional dependence of the above functions on
γ = (γA, γM) when there is no confusion. I also suppress the argument λ in Γ1(·) and
a1(·).
Following Morris (2001)’s notation, let











and let h(λ, k) be the unique value of δ solving











if k < V M(1)− V M(0); if k ≥ V M(1)− V M(0), let h(λ, k) =∞.
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Define
xA(λ, γA, γM , xM) ≡ 1− 1
xAoo(λ, γ






















− 1)2 + (1
2
− 1)2])})
uˆA(γA, 1)− uˆA(1− γA, 1) ,
Where uˆA(a1, s1) = −γA(a1−s1)2−(1−γA)(a1−(1−s1))2 denotes the aligned analyst’s
expected first period payoff if she observes signal s1 and the investor’s action is a1.
Claim 1 Suppose it is common knowledge that the aligned analyst is almost perfectly in-
formed and has higher precision than the misaligned analyst, i.e., γA = γH → 1 > γM
and xA ∈ (0, xA(λ, γA, γM , xM)] ∪ [xM ,∞). Then any informative communication in the
first period has to satisfy the following properties:
(1) Λ(0, 0) ≥ Λ(1, 0);
(2) The aligned analyst always reports truthfully, i.e., σA1 (s1) = s1;
(3) The misaligned analyst always reports 1 when she observes signal 1, i.e., σM1 (1) = 1.
I prove the result in eight steps. Each step identifies a property that must hold for first period
informative communication when γA = γH → 1 > γM and xA ∈ (0, xA(λ, γA, γM , xM)]∪
[xM ,∞). The first four steps hold for generic γ = (γA, γM) and xA.
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Property 1. Λ(0, 0) ≥ Λ(1, 0).
Prove by contradiction. Suppose Λ(0, 0) < Λ(1, 0), there are 2 subcases:
(i) Λ(0, 0) < Λ(1, 0) and Λ(1, 1) > Λ(0, 1).
Now ΠMR (s1) < 0 and Π
M
C (s1) ≥ 0 for s1 = 0, 1. Therefore σM1 (0) = σM1 (1) = 1. Then
if σA1 (0) = σ
A
1 (1) = 1, the communication in the first period is uninformative, which is a
contradiction. If σA1 (0) 6= 1 or σA1 (1) 6= 1, then Λ(0, 1) = 1 or Λ(0, 0) = 1, contradicting
“Λ(0, 0) < Λ(1, 0) and Λ(1, 1) > Λ(0, 1)”.
(ii) Λ(0, 0) < Λ(1, 0) and Λ(1, 1) ≤ Λ(0, 1).
In this case, ΠMR (1) > Π
M
R (0), which, together with the fact that Π
M
C (1) = Π
M
C (0),
implies that either σM1 (1) = 0, or σ
M
1 (0) = 1. Then, φ
M
1 (1|1) ≤ φM1 (1|0). On the other
hand, by the definition of Λ in (1.2), Λ(0, 0) < Λ(1, 0) ⇒ φA1 (1|0) > φM1 (1|0), and
Λ(1, 1) ≤ Λ(0, 1) ⇒ φA1 (1|1) ≤ φM1 (1|1). Therefore, φA1 (1|1) ≤ φM1 (1|1) ≤ φM1 (1|0) <
φA1 (1|0). Thus, by (1.1), a1(1) = Γ1(1) < Γ1(0) = a1(0). A contradiction (recall that
a1(1) ≥ a1(0) is assumed without loss of generality).
To conclude, Λ(0, 0) < Λ(1, 0) is impossible for informative communication. There-
fore Λ(0, 0) ≥ Λ(1, 0).
Property 2. a1(1) = Γ1(1) > Γ1(0) = a1(0).
Given property 1, Λ(0, 0) ≥ Λ(1, 0), there are two subcases. The idea is to show that
Γ1(1) > Γ1(0) holds for both subcases.
(i) Λ(0, 0) ≥ Λ(1, 0) and Λ(0, 1) ≥ Λ(1, 1).
First, I claim that at least one of the inequalities is strict. Suppose not, that is, both
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inequalities hold with equality. If Γ1(1) = Γ1(0), the communication is noninformative,
which is a contradiction. If Γ1(1) > Γ1(0), then the misaligned analyst will always report 1
since there are no reputational consequences. Thus, the investor will know for sure that the
analyst is aligned if he receives message 0, i.e, Λ(0, 0) = 1, which implies that Λ(1, 0) = 1
given that Λ(0, 0) = Λ(1, 0). Obviously, Λ(1, 0) = 1 is contradicting σM1 (0) = σ
M
1 (1) = 1.
Therefore, at least one of the inequalities is strict. As a result, ΠJR(s1) > 0 for J = M,A
and s1 = 0, 1. Suppose Γ1(1) = Γ1(0), then it follows that ΠJC(s1) = 0 for J = M,A and
s1 = 0, 1. Therefore, σJ1 (s1) = 0, the communication is noninformative. A contradiction.
(ii) Λ(0, 0) ≥ Λ(1, 0) and Λ(0, 1) < Λ(1, 1).
In this case, ΠMR (0) > Π
M




R(1). Suppose Γ1(1) = Γ1(0). Then
ΠJC(s1) = 0 for each J = M,A and s1 = 0, 1. Therefore, for J = M,A, either σ
J
1 (0) = 0,
or σJ1 (1) = 1. I.e., σ
J
1 (1) ≥ σJ1 (0).
In addition, by (1.1), Γ1(1) = Γ1(0) implies that:
1
Γ1(1)





1 (1|0) + (1− λ)φM1 (1|0)
λφA1 (1|1) + (1− λ)φM1 (1|1)
=
λφA1 (0|0) + (1− λ)φM1 (0|0)
λφA1 (0|1) + (1− λ)φM1 (0|1)
⇐⇒ λφ
A
1 (1|0) + (1− λ)φM1 (1|0)
λφA1 (1|1) + (1− λ)φM1 (1|1)
= 1
⇐⇒ λ(2γA − 1)[σA1 (1)− σA1 (0)] + (1− λ)(2γM − 1)[σM1 (1)− σM1 (0)] = 0.
(A.4)
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As a result, Γ1(1) = Γ1(0) holds only when σJ1 (1) = σ
J
1 (0) for J = M,A. There are four
scenarios then: (a) if σA1 (1) = σ
A
1 (0) = σ
M
1 (1) = σ
M
1 (0) = 1, then the communication
is noninformative. A contradiction; (b) if σA1 (1) = σ
A
1 (0) = σ
M
1 (1) = σ
M
1 (0) = 0, again
the communication is noninformative. A contradiction; (c) if σA1 (1) = σ
A
1 (0) = 1 and
σM1 (1) = σ
M
1 (0) = 0, then Λ(0, 0) = 0 and Λ(1, 0) = 1, contradicting Λ(0, 0) ≥ Λ(1, 0);
(d) if σA1 (1) = σ
A
1 (0) = 0 and σ
M
1 (1) = σ
M
1 (0) = 1, then Λ(1, 1) = 0 and Λ(0, 1) = 1,
contradicting Λ(0, 1) < Λ(1, 1).
To summarize, in any first period informative communication, Γ1(1) > Γ1(0) has to
hold.
Property 3. σA1 (0) = 0⇒ σA1 (1) > 0.
Prove by contradiction. Suppose σA1 (0) = σ
A
1 (1) = 0, then for Γ1(1) > Γ1(0) to hold,
it must be true that σM1 (1) > σ
M
1 (0). Thus, φ
M
1 (1|1) > φM1 (1|0), which directly leads
to φM1 (0|1) < φM1 (0|0). On the other hand, σA1 (0) = σA1 (1) = 0 implies that φA1 (0|1) =
φA1 (0|0) = 1. Hence, Λ(0, 1) > Λ(0, 0). In addition, σA1 (1) = σA1 (0) = 0 implies Λ(1, 1) =
Λ(1, 0) = 0. Therefore, ΠMR (1) > Π
M
R (0). Recall that Π
M
C (1) = Π
M
C (0), hence σ
M
1 (1) ≤
σM1 (0) has to hold, contradicting σ
M
1 (1) > σ
M
1 (0). Therefore, σ
A
1 (0) = 0 and σ
A
1 (1) = 0
cannot hold at the same time. Hence, σA1 (0) = 0⇒ σA1 (1) > 0.
Property 4. σA1 (0) = 0⇒ σM1 (0) ≤ σM1 (1).
Suppose σA1 (0) = 0 and σ
M
1 (0) > σ
M
1 (1). Then, by Property 3, σ
A
1 (1) > 0. Thus,
φA1 (1|1) > φA1 (1|0) and φA1 (0|1) < φA1 (0|0). On the other hand, σM1 (0) > σM1 (1) implies
that φM1 (1|1) < φM1 (1|0) and φM1 (0|1) > φM1 (0|0). Therefore, Λ(0, 0) > Λ(0, 1) and
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Λ(1, 1) > Λ(1, 0). Then ΠMR (1) < Π
M
R (0). Recall that Π
M
C (1) = Π
M
C (0), so σ
M
1 (0) ≤
σM1 (1), contradicting σ
M
1 (0) > σ
M
1 (1). Hence, σ
A
1 (0) = 0 and σ
M
1 (0) > σ
M
1 (1) cannot
hold at the same time. Therefore, σA1 (0) = 0⇒ σM1 (0) ≤ σM1 (1).
Property 5. σA1 (0) = 0.
Recall that
ΠAR(0) = (1− xA)[γA(V A(Λ(0, 0))− V A(Λ(1, 0))) + (1− γA)(V A(Λ(0, 1))− V A(Λ(1, 1)))].
Hence, limγA→1 ΠAR(0) = (1− xA)[V A(Λ(0, 0))− V A(Λ(1, 0))]. By Property 1, Λ(0, 0) ≥
Λ(1, 0), it follows that limγA→1 ΠAR(0) ≥ 0 . At the same time, Property 2, Γ1(1) > Γ1(0),
implies that ΠAC(0) < 0. Therefore σ
A
1 (0) = 0.
Property 6. σA1 (1) > 0 and σM1 (0) ≤ σM1 (1) .
These directly follow from Property 3, Property 4, and Property 5.
Property 7. σA1 (1) = 1.
Given property 1, there are two subcases:
(1) Λ(0, 0) ≥ Λ(1, 0) and Λ(0, 1) ≤ Λ(1, 1).
Then limγA→1 ΠAR(1) = (1− xA)[V A(Λ(0, 1))− V A(Λ(1, 1))] ≤ 0. At the same time,
ΠAC(1) > 0. Therefore σ
A
1 (1) = 1.
(2) Λ(0, 0) ≥ Λ(1, 0) and Λ(0, 1) > Λ(1, 1).
If xA ≤ xA(λ, γA, γM , xM), then the similar proof as in Proposition 2 of Morris (2001)
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shows that there is no informative equilibrium satisfying Λ(0, 0) ≥ Λ(1, 0) and Λ(0, 1) >
Λ(1, 1).
If xA ≥ xM , then σA1 (1) = 1. The proof includes the following two steps:
(i)
Λ(0, 1) > Λ(1, 1)⇒

σM1 (1) > 0
V M(Λ(0, 0))− V M(Λ(1, 0)) ≥ V M(Λ(0, 1))− V M(Λ(1, 1)).
By property 6, σM1 (0) ≤ σM1 (1). This includes the following 4 cases:
(a) σM1 (0) = σ
M
1 (1) = 0.
In this case, Λ(1, 1) = 1, contradicting Λ(0, 1) > Λ(1, 1).
(b) 0 ≤ σM1 (0) < σM1 (1) ≤ 1.
0 < σM1 (1) ≤ 1 ⇒ ΠMR (1) ≤ ΠMC (1); and 0 ≤ σM1 (0) < 1 ⇒ ΠMR (0) ≥ ΠMC (0).
Therefore, ΠMR (0) ≥ ΠMC (0) = ΠMC (1) ≥ ΠMR (1). By the definition of ΠMR (·), ΠMR (0) ≥
ΠMR (1)⇒ V M(Λ(0, 0))− V M(Λ(1, 0)) ≥ V M(Λ(0, 1))− V M(Λ(1, 1)).
(c) 0 < σM1 (0) = σ
M
1 (1) < 1.
0 < σM1 (1) < 1 ⇒ ΠMR (1) = ΠMC (1); and 0 < σM1 (0) < 1 ⇒ ΠMR (0) = ΠMC (0).
Therefore, ΠMR (0) = Π
M
C (0) = Π
M
C (1) = Π
M
R (1). By the definition of Π
M
R (·), ΠMR (0) =
ΠMR (1)⇒ V M(Λ(0, 0))− V M(Λ(1, 0)) = V M(Λ(0, 1))− V M(Λ(1, 1)).
(d) σM1 (0) = σ
M
1 (1) = 1.
In this case, it must be true that Λ(0, 1) = Λ(0, 0) = 1. At the same time, σA1 (0) <
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σA1 (1) and σ
M
1 (0) = σ
M
1 (1) = 1 imply Λ(1, 0) < Λ(1, 1). Thus, V
M(Λ(0, 0))−V M(Λ(1, 0)) >
V M(Λ(0, 1))− V M(Λ(1, 1)).
(ii)
V M(Λ(0, 0))− V M(Λ(1, 0)) ≥ V M(Λ(0, 1))− V M(Λ(1, 1))
Λ(0, 1) > Λ(1, 1)
σM1 (1) > 0

⇒ σA1 (1) = 1.
Now, we have
ΠMR (1) = (1− xM)[γM [V M(Λ(0, 1))− V M(Λ(1, 1))] + (1− γM)[V M(Λ(0, 0))− V M(Λ(1, 0))]]
≥ (1− xM)[V M(Λ(0, 1))− V M(Λ(1, 1))]
> (1− xM)[V A(Λ(0, 1))− V A(Λ(1, 1))]
=
1− xM
1− xA limγA→1 Π
A
R(1).






. At the same
time, limγA→1 ΠAC(1) =
xA
xM
ΠMC (1). In addition, σ
M
1 (1) > 0 ⇒ ΠMR (1) ≤ ΠMC (1).
Therefore, limγA→1 ΠAC(1) =
xA
xM





xM (1−xA) limγA→1 Π
A
R(1) ≥
limγA→1 ΠAR(1) for x
A ≥ xM . As a result, σA1 (1) = 1 when γA → 1.
Property 8. σM1 (1) = 1.
Again, there are two subcases:
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(1) Λ(0, 0) ≥ Λ(1, 0) and Λ(0, 1) ≤ Λ(1, 1).
In this case, ΠMR (0) > Π
M
R (1), which together with Π
M
C (0) = Π
M
C (1), implies σ
M
1 (1) =
1 or σM1 (0) = 0. Suppose σ
M
1 (1) 6= 1, then σM1 (0) = 0. Recall that σA1 (0) = 0 and























As a result, Λ(1, 0) > Λ(0, 1) and Λ(1, 1) > Λ(0, 0). Hence, Λ(1, 1) > Λ(0, 0) ≥
Λ(1, 0) > Λ(0, 1). Therefore, ΠMR (1) < 0. At the same time, Π
M
C (1) > 0. Then σ
M
1 (1) = 1
follows immediately.
(2) Λ(0, 0) ≥ Λ(1, 0) and Λ(0, 1) > Λ(1, 1).
Λ(0, 1) > Λ(1, 1) implies that φM1 (1|1) > φA1 (1|1) = γA. If γA → 1, then φM1 (1|1)→
1, which implies that Λ(0, 1) → Λ(1, 1) and σM1 (s1) → 1 for s1 = 0, 1. At the same time,
φA1 (1|0) = 1− γA → 0 and φM1 (1|0)→ 1, which implies Λ(0, 0) >> Λ(1, 0). As a result,
ΠMR (0) > Π
M
R (1). Recall that Π
M
C (0) = Π
M
C (1), therefore either σ
M
1 (1) = 1 or σ
M
1 (0) = 0.
Suppose σM1 (1) 6= 1, then σM1 (0) = 0. Then φM1 (1|1) = γMσM1 (1) < γA = φA1 (1|1),
which contradicts Λ(0, 1) > Λ(1, 1). Therefore, σM1 (1) = 1.
Claim 2 If the misaligned analyst is (weakly) better informed than the aligned analyst,
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i.e., γA ≤ γM , then any informative communication in the first period has to satisfy the
following properties:
(1) The investor updates favorably his belief about the analyst’s type when receiving
report 0. More specifically, Λ(0, 1) ≥ Λ(1, 1) and Λ(0, 0) ≥ Λ(1, 0), and at least
one of the inequalities is strict;
(2) The aligned analyst reports 0 when she observes signal 0, i.e. σA1 (0) = 0. If she
observes signal 1, the aligned analyst reports 1 with positive probability, i.e. σA1 (1) >
0;
(3) The misaligned analyst reports 1 with positive probability for both signals. In addi-
tion, she reports 1 more often when she observes signal 1 than when she observes
signal 0, i.e. σM1 (1) ≥ σM1 (0) > 0.
I prove the result in nine steps. Each step identifies a property that must hold for first
period informative communication when γA ≤ γM .
Property 1-4. The first four steps are the same as the proof of Claim 1.
Property 5. Λ(1, 1) ≤ Λ(0, 1).
Prove by contradiction. Suppose instead Λ(1, 1) > Λ(0, 1). By Property 1, Λ(0, 0) ≥
Λ(1, 0). Thus, ΠJR(1) < Π
J




Therefore, either σJ1 (0) = 0, or σ
J
1 (1) = 1. At the same time,
Λ(1, 1) > Λ(0, 1) =⇒ φA1 (1|1) > φM1 (1|1)
=⇒ γAσA1 (1) + (1− γA)σA1 (0) > γMσM1 (1) + (1− γM)σM1 (0).(A.5)
Λ(0, 0) ≥ Λ(1, 0) =⇒ φA1 (1|0) ≤ φM1 (1|0)
=⇒ γAσA1 (0) + (1− γA)σA1 (1) ≤ γMσM1 (0) + (1− γM)σM1 (1).(A 6)
There are four subcases:
(a) σA1 (0) = σ
M
1 (0) = 0.
In this case, (A.5) can be reduced to γAσA1 (1) > γ
MσM1 (1), which implies that σ
A
1 (1) >
σM1 (1) because γ
M ≥ γA. On the other hand, by (A.6), (1− γA)σA1 (1) ≤ (1− γM)σM1 (1),
which leads to σA1 (1) ≤ σM1 (1). A contradiction.
(b) σA1 (1) = σ
M
1 (1) = 1.
In this case, by (A.6),
γAσA1 (0) + 1− γA ≤ γMσM1 (0) + 1− γM ⇒ γA(1− σA1 (0)) ≥ γM(1− σM1 (0))
⇒ σA1 (0) ≤ σM1 (0).
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On the other hand, (A.5) can be reduced to:
γA + (1− γA)σA1 (0) > γM + (1− γM)σM1 (0)
⇒ (γM − γA)(σA1 (0)− 1) + (1− γM)[σA1 (0)− σM1 (0)] > 0
⇒ σA1 (0) > σM1 (0).
Again a contradiction.
(c) σA1 (0) = 0 and σ
M
1 (1) = 1.
In this case, (A.5) can be reduced to γAσA1 (1) > γ




≥ 1. A contradiction.
(d) σA1 (1) = 1 and σ
M
1 (0) = 0.
By (A.6),
γAσA1 (0) + 1− γA ≤ (1− γM)σM1 (1)⇒
{
σM1 (1) ≥ 1−γ
A
1−γM > 1, if γ
M > γA
σM1 (1) = 1 and σ
A
1 (0) = 0. if γ
M = γA
If γM > γA, σM1 (1) > 1. A contradiction. If γ
M = γA, then σM1 (1) = 1 and σ
A
1 (0) = 0,
which, combining with σA1 (1) = 1 and σ
M
1 (0) = 0, implies that φ
M
1 (1|1) = φA1 (1|1),
contracting (A.5).
To summarize, Λ(1, 1) > Λ(0, 1) leads to a contradiction in every possible scenario.
Hence, Λ(1, 1) ≤ Λ(0, 1).
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Property 6. Λ(0, 0) ≥ Λ(1, 0) and Λ(1, 1) ≤ Λ(0, 1), and at least one of these inequal-
ities is strict.
By Property 1 and Property 5, Λ(0, 0) ≥ Λ(1, 0) and Λ(1, 1) ≤ Λ(0, 1). Suppose
both hold with equality. Then, there is no reputational consequence of reporting 1, and
Γ1(1) > Γ1(0) implies σM1 (1) = σ
M
1 (0) = 1. Therefore, Λ(0, 0) > Λ(1, 0), contradicting
Λ(0, 0) = Λ(1, 0).
Property 7. σA1 (0) = 0.
By Property 6, ΠAR(0) > 0; by Property 2, Π
A
C(0) < 0. Hence, σ
A
1 (0) = 0.
Property 8. σA1 (1) > 0 and σM1 (0) ≤ σM1 (1).
These directly follow from Property 3, Property 4, and Property 7.
Property 9. σM1 (0) > 0.
Prove by contradiction. Suppose that σM1 (0) = 0. Then, Λ(0, 0) ≥ Λ(1, 0) (Property 1)






















≤ 1− (1− γ
A)σM1 (1)
1− (1− γA)σA1 (1)
≤ 1− (1− γ
M)σM1 (1)





The inequality comes from γM ≥ γA and σA1 (1) ≤ σM1 (1). Therefore, Λ(1, 1) ≤ Λ(1, 0)
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and Λ(0, 1) ≥ Λ(0, 0). Then Λ(0, 1) ≥ Λ(0, 0) ≥ Λ(1, 0) ≥ Λ(1, 1). As a result, ΠMR (1) ≥
ΠMR (0). Hence, σ
M
1 (1) ≤ σM1 (0) (because ΠMC (1) = ΠMC (0)). Since σM1 (0) = 0, it
must be true that σM1 (1) = 0. Then, Λ(1, 1) = 1 > Λ(0, 1), contradicting Property 5,
Λ(1, 1) ≤ Λ(0, 1).
Proof of Lemma 1 is the same as the proof of Proposition 2 in Morris (2001) and
thus is omitted.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 1
Suppose the investor holds conjectures that:
σ˜A1 (0|γA = γM) = 0, σ˜A1 (1|γA = γM) = 1, σ˜M1 (0|γA = γM) = µ ∈ (0, 1], σ˜M1 (1|γA = γM) = 1,
then






















A = γM) = 1− γA + 2γ
A − 1
1 + (1− λ)µ ; a1(0, γ
A = γM) = 1− γA. (A.7)
For this to be an equilibrium, it must be true that the investor’s above conjectures are
consistent with the analysts’ best responses. That is, the following inequalities have to
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hold:
ΠAR(0|γA = γM) ≥ ΠAC(0|γA = γM) (A.8)
ΠAR(1|γA = γM) ≤ ΠAC(1|γA = γM) (A.9)
ΠMR (0|γA = γM) ≤ ΠMC (0|γA = γM) (A.10)
ΠMR (1|γA = γM) ≤ ΠMC (1|γA = γM) (A.11)
The following four steps show that when xA ≥ xM → 0, we could indeed find µ such
that the inequalities (A.8)-(A.11) hold.
(I) Condition (A.8) always holds.
Given the type inference function and the state inference function derived in (A.7), it
is readily to show that ΠAR(0|γA = γM) > 0 and ΠAC(0|γA = γM) < 0. Therefore, (A.8)
always holds.
(II) (A.10)⇒ (A.11).
According to (A.7), Λ(0, 0|γA = γM) = Λ(0, 1|γA = γM) and Λ(1, 0|γA = γM) <
Λ(1, 1|γA = γM), which imply that ΠMR (1|γA = γM) < ΠMR (0|γA = γM). Recall that
ΠMC (1|γA = γM) = ΠMC (0|γA = γM), hence if (A.10) holds, (A.11) must hold.
(III) When xA ≥ xM → 0, (A.10)⇒ (A.9).
We first write out ΠMC (0|γA = γM), ΠAC(1|γA = γM), ΠMR (0|γA = γM) and ΠAR(1|γA =
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γM).
ΠMC (0|γA = γM) = −xM [a1(1, γA = γM)− 1]2 + xM [a1(0, γA = γM)− 1]2
= xM
(2γA − 1)[1 + 2γAµ(1− λ)]
[1 + µ(1− λ)]2 ,
ΠAC(1|γA = γM) = −xA[γA(a1(1, γA = γM)− 1)2 + (1− γA)(a1(1, γA = γM))2]
+xA[γA(a1(0, γ
A = γM)− 1)2 + (1− γA)(a1(0, γA = γM))2]
= xA
(2γA − 1)2[1 + 2µ(1− λ)]
[1 + µ(1− λ)]2 ,
ΠMR (0|γA = γM) = (1− xM)γA[V M(Λ(0, 0|γA = γM), γA)− V M(Λ(1, 0|γA = γM), γA)]














[Λ(0, 1|γA = γM)− Λ(1, 1|γA = γM)]
= (1− xM)γA2(2γ








































(1−µ) ] and λ
∗∗











ΠAR(1|γA = γM) = (1− xA)(1− γA)[V A(Λ(0, 0|γA = γM), γA)− V A(Λ(1, 0|γA = γM), γA)]
+(1− xA)γA[V A(Λ(0, 1|γA = γM), γA)− V A(Λ(1, 1|γA = γM), γA)]

















[Λ(0, 1|γA = γM)− Λ(1, 1|γA = γM)]
= (1− xA)(1− γA)(2γ







































(1−µ) ] and λ
++











Suppose (A.10) holds. If xM → 0, by (A.10), then µ → 0. This implies that
















→ λ. Therefore, λ∗2 → λ, λ∗∗2 → λ, λ+2 → λ,
and λ++2 → λ. Hence,
lim
xM→0
ΠMC (0|γA = γM)
xM





= (2γA − 1)2,
lim
xM→0
ΠMR (0|γA = γM)
µ
= (1− xM)2(2γ
A − 1)(1− λγA)











A − 1)2(1− λ)
(2− λ)3 λ(1− λ).
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ΠMR (0|γA = γM)
=
(1− xA)(2γA − 1)(1− λ)
















ΠMC (0|γA = γM)
= (2γA − 1) x
A
xM









ΠMC (0|γA = γM)








Recall that for xM → 0, ΠMR (0|γA = γM) = ΠMC (0|γA = γM). Therefore, by (A.12),
limxM→0 ΠAR(1|γA = γM) < limxM→0 ΠAC(1|γA = γM). Hence, for xA ≥ xM → 0, (A.10)
implies (A.9).
(IV) Now the problem is reduced to see whether we could find µ such that (A.10) holds.
Given that there is only one condition (A.10) to satisfy, it immediately follows that we can
always find µ satisfying the condition.
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Therefore, the truth-telling equilibrium in which the aligned analyst tells the truth can
always obtain in the first period when xA ≥ xM → 0.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose the investor holds conjectures that:
σ˜A1 (0|γA > γM) = 0, σ˜A1 (1|γA > γM) = 1, σ˜M1 (0|γA > γM) = 0, σ˜M1 (1|γA > γM) = 1,
then













A > γM) = γAλ+ γM(1− λ),
a1(0, γ
A > γM) = 1− γAλ− γM(1− λ). (A.13)
Clearly Λ(1, 1|γA > γM) = Λ(0, 0|γA > γM) > Λ(1, 0|γA > γM) = Λ(0, 1|γA >
γM). Now I examine whether indeed the analysts’ best responses are consistent with the
investor’s conjectures. It is readily to show that both types of analysts have reputational in-
centives to tell the truth, i.e., ΠJR(0|γA > γM) > 0 and ΠJR(1|γA > γM) < 0, J ∈ {A,M}.
The aligned analyst also has current incentive to tell the truth, while the misaligned an-
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alyst always has current incentive to report 1. Therefore, the aligned analyst will indeed
truthfully report her signal and the misaligned analyst will truthfully report 1 if she ob-
serves signal 1. On the other hand, if the misaligned analyst observes signal 0, she has
reputational incentive to report 0, while her current incentive is to report 1.
ΠMC (0|γA > γM) = −xM(a1(1, γA > γM)− 1)2 + xM(a1(0, γA > γM)− 1)2
> 0,
ΠMR (0|γA > γM) = (1− xM)(2γM − 1)[V M(Λ(0, 0|γA > γM), γA)
−V M(Λ(1, 0|γA > γM), γA)]
> 0





A, γM) ≡ (2γ
M − 1)[V M(Λ(0, 0|γA > γM), γA)− V M(Λ(1, 0|γA > γM), γA)]
−(a1(1, γA > γM)− 1)2 + (a1(0, γA > γM)− 1)2
=











2(1− λ)γM + 2λγA − 1 ,
then ΠMC (0|γA > γM) < ΠMR (0|γA > γM). Hence, σM1 (0|γA > γM) = 0, consistent with
the investor’s conjecture.
To summarize, if γA > γM , the truth-telling equilibrium in which both types of analysts
truthfully report their signals obtains in the first period for xM < xM(λ, γA, γM).
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
As Section 1.3.1 and Proposition 1 have shown, if the investor conjectures that only the
aligned analyst acquires information, both types of analysts truthfully report in the first
period, and in the second period the aligned analyst reports truthfully and the misaligned
analyst always reports 1, then the best responses of the analysts who have conjectured pre-
cision will indeed be consistent with the investor’s conjectures. Now it remains to show
that given the investor’s conjectures, for moderate information-gathering costs c, it is in-
deed the aligned analyst’s best response to become better informed, while the misaligned
analyst’s optimal choice is to keep the default precision.
First, I introduce the analyst’s current reporting incentive and reputational reporting
incentive when the analyst’s precision is unobservable. Write ΠJC(s1, γ
J |γ˜) for the current
expected gain to the type J analyst of reporting 1, rather than reporting 0, given signal s1,
precision γJ , and the investor’s conjecture of analysts’ precision γ˜ = (γ˜A, γ˜M). Therefore,
ΠAC(s1, γ
A|γ˜) = − xA{γA(a1(1, γ˜)− s1)2 + (1− γA)(a1(1, γ˜)− (1− s1))2}
+ xA{γA(a1(0, γ˜)− s1)2 + (1− γA)(a1(0, γ˜)− (1− s1))2},
ΠMC (1, γ
M |γ˜) = ΠMC (0, γM |γ˜) = −xM(a1(1, γ˜)− 1)2 + xM(a1(0, γ˜)− 1)2.
Write ΠJR(s1, γ
J |γ˜) for the expected reputational gain to the type J analyst of reporting 0
rather than reporting 1, when she observes signal s1 and has precision γJ and the investor’s
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conjecture of analysts’ precision is γ˜. Hence,
ΠAR(s1, γ
A|γ˜) = (1− xA)γA[V A(Λ(0, s1|γ˜), γA, γ˜)− V A(Λ(1, s1|γ˜), γA, γ˜)]
+ (1− xA)(1− γA)[V A(Λ(0, 1− s1|γ˜), γA, γ˜)− V A(Λ(1, 1− s1|γ˜), γA, γ˜)],
ΠMR (s1, γ
M |γ˜) = (1− xM)γM [V M(Λ(0, s1|γ˜), γ˜)− V M(Λ(1, s1|γ˜), γ˜)]
+ (1− xM)(1− γM)[V M(Λ(0, 1− s1|γ˜), γ˜)− V M(Λ(1, 1− s1|γ˜), γ˜)].
Thus a type J analyst has a strict incentive to report 1 when she observes s1 and has preci-
sion γJ if and only if ΠJC(s1, γ
J |γ˜) > ΠJR(s1, γJ |γ˜).
To examine analysts’ best responses with regard to information acquisition decisions,
we also need to check their best communication decisions off-the-equilibrium path given
the investor’s conjecture that γ˜A = γH and γ˜M = γL.
(1) The aligned analyst:
(i) Given the investor’s conjectures, for γH → 1 and γL ≥ 0.75, the aligned analyst’s
best response in the second period is to tell the truth no matter what her true precision is.
If the investor conjectures that γ˜A = γH , then the aligned analyst with the conjec-
tured precision γA = γH will tell the truth. For the aligned analyst with precision γL,
when she observes signal 1, she will compare her payoff conditional on sending message
0, −γL(a2(0, λ2, γH) − 1)2 − (1 − γL)(a2(0, λ2, γH) − 0)2, with her payoff conditional
on sending message 1, −γL(a2(1, λ2, γH) − 1)2 − (1 − γL)(a2(1, λ2, γH) − 0)2. The dif-
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ference (of sending message 0 over 1) is [a2(1, λ2, γH) − a2(0, λ2, γH)][a2(1, λ2, γH) +
a2(0, λ2, γH) − 2γL] < 0. Hence the aligned analyst with precision γL will report 1
when her signal is 1. On the other hand, if the aligned analyst has precision γL and
observes signal 0, she will again compare her payoff conditional on sending message
0,−γL(a2(0, λ2, γH)− 0)2 − (1− γL)(a2(0, λ2, γH)− 1)2, with her payoff conditional on
sending message 1,−γL(a2(1, λ2, γH)−0)2− (1−γL)(a2(1, λ2, γH)−1)2. The difference
(of sending message 0 over 1) is
[a2(1, λ2, γH)− a2(0, λ2, γH)][a2(1, λ2, γH) + a2(0, λ2, γH)− 2(1− γL)] > 0 for γL ≥ 0.75.
Therefore, the aligned analyst with precision γL will report 0 when her signal is 0. Then
V A(λ2, γ
A = γH , γ˜
A = γH)− V A(λ2, γA = γL, γ˜A = γH)
= −1
2
(γH − γL)[(a2(1, λ2, γH)− 1)2 − (a2(0, λ2, γH)− 1)2 + (a2(0, λ2, γH))2 − (a2(1, λ2, γH))2]
= (γH − γL)[a2(1, λ2, γH)− a2(0, λ2, γH)]
= (γH − γL)2γH − 1
2− λ2 .
(ii) Given the investor’s conjectures, for γH → 1 and γL ≥ 0.75, the aligned analyst’s
best response in the first period is to tell the truth no matter what her true precision is.
Given the investor’s conjectures, the type inference function and the state inference
function are derived as in (A.13). By Proposition 1, the aligned analyst with the conjectured
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precision γH will indeed tell the truth. For the aligned analyst with precision γL,
ΠAC(1, γL|γ˜A = γH , γ˜M = γL)
= xA[a1(0, γH , γL)− a1(1, γH , γL)][a1(0, γH , γL) + a1(1, γH , γL)− 2γL]
= xA[a1(0, γH , γL)− a1(1, γH , γL)](1− 2γL)
> 0,
ΠAR(1, γL|γ˜A = γH , γ˜M = γL)
= (1− xA)(1− 2γL)[V A(Λ(0, 0|γH , γL), γL, γ˜A = γH)− V A(Λ(1, 0|γH , γL), γL, γ˜A = γH)]
Given that the aligned analyst tells the truth off-the-equilibrium path in the second period,
V A(λ2, γL, γ˜
A = γH) = −1
2
γL[a2(1, λ2, γH)− 1]2 − 1
2
(1− γL)[a2(0, λ2, γH)− 1]2
−1
2
(1− γL)[a2(1, λ2, γH)− 0]2 − 1
2
γL[a2(0, λ2, γH)− 0]2










λ+ (1− λ)γL , γH)− 1]
2 − 1
2
(1− γL)[a2(1, λ2 = λ





γL[a2(1, λ2 = 0, γH)− 1]2 + 1
2




[a2(1, 0, γH)− a2(1, λ
λ+ (1− λ)γL , γH)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
[a2(1, 0, γH) + a2(1,
λ






a2(1, 0, γH) + a2(1,
λ











λ+ (λ+ 2(1− λ)γL)(2− 4γL)
4γL(1− λ) + 2λ




ΠAR(1, γL|γ˜A = γH , γ˜M = γL) < 0 for γL ≥ 0.75.
Hence, the aligned analyst with precision γA = γL will truthfully report 1 if she observes 1,
i.e., σA1 (1, γL|γ˜A = γH , γ˜M = γL) = 1. Analogously, it is easy to show that σA1 (0, γL|γ˜A =
γH , γ˜
M = γL) = 0 for γH → 1 and γL ≥ 0.75. To summarize, given the investor’s
conjecture that γ˜A = γH , γ˜M = γL and both types of analysts tell the truth in the first
period, for γH → 1 and γL ≥ 0.75, the aligned analyst will tell the truth on and off the
equilibrium path.
(iii) The aligned analyst’s choice of precision:
Given that the aligned analyst tells the truth in the first period on and off the equilibrium
path, her utility at the information acquisition stage if she becomes better informed is as
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follows (the arguments in a1(·) are m1, γ˜A, and γ˜M ):
UA0 (γ
















(1− γH)[−xA(a1(1, γH , γL))2 + (1− xA)V A(Λ(1, 0|γH , γL), γH , γH)]− c.
If the aligned analyst keeps her default precision, it’s straightforward that
UA0 (γ
















(1− γL)[−xA(a1(1, γH , γL))2 + (1− xA)V A(Λ(1, 0|γH , γL), γL, γH)].
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Define ∆A as the benefit to the aligned analyst from acquiring information. Then,
∆A ≡ UA0 (γA = γH |γ˜A = γH , γ˜M = γL) + c− UA0 (γA = γL|γ˜A = γH , γ˜M = γL)
= (γH − γL)xA[a1(1, γH , γL)− a1(0, γH , γL)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
PEA1
+ (γH − γL)(1− xA)[V A(Λ(0, 0|γH , γL), γH , γH)− V A(Λ(1, 0|γH , γL), γH , γH)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
REA
+ γL(1− xA)[V A(Λ(0, 0|γH , γL), γH , γH)− V A(Λ(0, 0|γH , γL), γL, γH)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Part i of PEA2
+ (1− γL)(1− xA)[V A(Λ(1, 0|γH , γL), γH , γH)− V A(Λ(1, 0|γH , γL), γL, γH)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Part ii of PEA2
= (γH − γL)xA[2γL(1− λ) + 2γHλ− 1]










, γH , γH)]























where PEAt stands for Precision Effect in period t for the aligned analyst and RE
A stands
for Reputation Effect for the aligned analyst.
Clearly, for c < ∆¯, the aligned analyst will have incentive to acquire information,
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consistent with the investor’s conjecture. Also notice that
PEA1 = (γH − γL)xA[a1(1, γH , γL)− a1(0, γH , γL)]
= (γH − γL)xA[2γL(1− λ) + 2γHλ− 1]
> (γH − γL)xA(2γL − 1)
> (γH − γL)xA(γH − 1
2
) for γL ≥ 0.75
PEA2 = γL(1− xA)[V A(Λ(0, 0|γH , γL), γH , γH)− V A(Λ(0, 0|γH , γL), γL, γH)]
+ (1− γL)(1− xA)[V A(Λ(1, 0|γH , γL), γH , γH)− V A(Λ(1, 0|γH , γL), γL, γH)]
> (1− xA)[V A(Λ(1, 0|γH , γL), γH , γH)− V A(Λ(1, 0|γH , γL), γL, γH)]




∆¯ = PEA1 +RE
A + PEA2
> PEA1 + PE
A
2
> (γH − γL)(γH − 1
2
)
(2) The misaligned analyst:
(i) Given the investor’s conjectures, the misaligned analyst’s best response in the second
period is to always report 1 no matter what her true precision is.
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(ii) Given the investor’s conjectures, for xM < xM(λ, γH , γL), the misaligned analyst’s
best response in the first period is to report truthfully no matter what her true precision is.
Note that the misaligned analyst would have more reputational incentive to tell the truth
when the precision is higher (because Λ(0, 0|γH , γL) > Λ(1, 0|γH , γL) and Λ(0, 1|γH , γL) <
Λ(1, 1|γH , γL)), while her current incentive to report 1 is independent of her precision.
Therefore, having a higher precision would make the misaligned analyst more likely to
tell the truth. According to the argument in Proposition 1, for xM < xM(λ, γH , γL), the
misaligned analyst with the equilibrium precision γM = γL will tell the truth, hence the
misaligned analyst with precision γM = γH will also tell the truth.
(iii) The misaligned analyst’s choice of precision:
The misaligned analyst’s utility at the information acquisition stage conditional on
keeping the default precision is:
UM0 (γ




[−xM(a1(1, γH , γL)− 1)2] + 1
2








(1− xM)[γLV M(Λ(0, 0|γH , γL), γH) + (1− γL)V M(Λ(1, 0|γH , γL), γH).








[−xM(a1(1, γH , γL)− 1)2] + 1
2








(1− xM)[γHV M(Λ(0, 0|γH , γL), γH) + (1− γH)V M(Λ(1, 0|γH , γL), γH).
Then the benefit of becoming better informed for the misaligned analyst is








(1− xM)(γH − γL)[V M(Λ(1, 1|γH , γL), γH)− V M(Λ(0, 1|γH , γL), γH)]
= (1− xM)(γH − γL)[V M(Λ(0, 0|γH , γL), γH)− V M(Λ(1, 0|γH , γL), γH)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
REM












For c > ∆, the misaligned analyst will not acquire information, again consistent with the
investor’s conjecture.
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Last, we need to check whether ∆ < c < ∆¯ is an empty set. Notice that
∆ < (1− xM)(γH − γL)[V M(λ2 = 1, γH)− V M(λ2 = 0, γH)]
= (1− xM)(γH − γL)(γH − 1
2
)(2− γH − 1
2
)




Therefore, for ∆ < c < ∆¯, the aligned analyst will acquire information and the misaligned
analyst will keep her default precision, consistent with the investor’ conjectures.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Define co ≡ min{(1 − xA)(γH − γL)(γL − 12),∆}. The idea of the proof is to show
that (1) If c < co, then there exists an equilibrium in which γA∗ = γH , γM
∗
= γL, first
period communication is babbling and second period communication is informative. (2)
For xM < xM(λ, γH , γL), xA ∈ (0, xA(λ, γA, γM , xM)] ∪ [xM ,∞), γH → 1 and c < co,
there is no other informative equilibria.
(1) Suppose the investor conjectures that γ˜A = γH , γ˜M = γL, first period communica-
tion is babbling, and second period communication is informative. Then the analysts’ best
responses in each communication period are consistent with these conjectures. For the mis-
127
aligned analyst, both her first period communication (babbling) and second period commu-
nication (always reports 1) are independent of her actual precision, hence she doesn’t have
incentive to acquire information. However, the aligned analyst’s benefit from acquiring
information is (1−xA)[V A(λ, γH , γH)−V A(λ, γL, γH)] = (1−xA)(γH−γL)2γH−12−λ > co,
hence the aligned analyst will acquire information. Therefore, for c < co, there exists an
equilibrium in which γA∗ = γH , γM
∗
= γL, first period communication is babbling and
second period communication is informative.
(2) I prove this result by ruling out the impossible equilibria one by one. As shown in
the main text, informative communication always obtains in the second period.
(i) Suppose in the postulated equilibrium, the aligned analyst keeps the default precision
γL. Then, in the second period, the aligned analyst with the conjectured precision γL will
always tell the truth (similar arguments as in Section 1.3.1). In addition, the aligned analyst
with γA = γH will also tell the truth. Hence,
V A(λ2, γ
A = γH , γ˜
A = γL)− V A(λ2, γA = γL, γ˜A = γL)
= −1
2
(γH − γL)[(a2(1, λ2, γL)− 1)2 − (a2(0, λ2, γL)− 1)2 + (a2(0, λ2, γL))2 − (a2(1, λ2, γL))2]
= (γH − γL)[a2(1, λ2, γL)− a2(0, λ2, γL)]
=
(γH − γL)(2γL − 1)




If first period communication is babbling, then the aligned analyst’s benefit from acquir-
ing information is (1−xA)[V A(λ, γH , γL)−V A(λ, γL, γL)] > (1−xA)(γH−γL)(γL− 12) ≥
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co, therefore the aligned analyst will have incentive to acquire information, upsetting the
postulated equilibria.
If first period communication is informative, then according to Claim 2, σA1 (0, γL|γL, γ˜M) =
0 and σA1 (1, γL|γL, γ˜M) > 0. Therefore, by the definition of mixed strategy, the aligned
analyst’s utility if she keeps the default precision (given the investor’s equilibrium conjec-
tures) can be calculated by treating σA1 (1, γL|γL, γ˜M) = 1. On the other hand, by reveal
preference, the aligned analyst’s utility when having precision γH (given the investor’s con-
jecture that γ˜A = γL) under the optimal communication strategy is (weakly) greater than
her utility under the truth-telling strategy. Therefore, the aligned analyst’s benefit from
acquiring information is given by:
UA0 (γ
A = γH |γ˜A = γL, γ˜M) + c− UA0 (γA = γL|γ˜A = γL, γ˜M)



























(1− γH)(1− xA)[V A(Λ(0, 1|γL, γ˜M), γH , γL)− V A(Λ(0, 1|γL, γ˜M), γL, γL)]
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Notice that σA1 (1, γL|γL, γ˜M) > 0 implies that ΠAC(1, γL|γL, γ˜M) ≥ ΠAR(1, γL|γL, γ˜M),
which implies that I + II + III > 0. Hence,
UA0 (γ




Therefore, the aligned analyst will have incentive to acquire information, again upsetting
the postulated equilibria where the aligned analyst keeps the default precision.
(ii) Suppose in the postulated equilibria, both analysts acquire information. Then by
Claim 2, σM1 (1, γH |γH , γH) ≥ σM1 (0, γH |γH , γH) > 0, which implies that the misaligned
analyst’s utility if she acquires information (fixing the investor’s postulated equilibrium
strategy) can be calculated by treating σM1 (1, γH |γH , γH) = σM1 (0, γH |γH , γH) = 1. On
the other hand, σM1 (1, γH |γH , γH) ≥ σM1 (0, γH |γH , γH) implies that ΠMR (1, γH |γH , γH) ≤
ΠMR (0, γH |γH , γH), which in turn implies that
V M(Λ(0, 1|γH , γH), γH)−V M(Λ(1, 1|γH , γH), γH) ≤ V M(Λ(0, 0|γH , γH), γH)−V M(Λ(1, 0|γH , γH), γH).
Therefore, ΠMR (1, γL|γH , γH) ≤ ΠMR (0, γL|γH , γH) ≤ ΠMR (0, γH |γH , γH). Recall that
ΠMC (·) does not depend on the misaligned analyst’s signal nor her true precision. As
a result, σM1 (1, γL|γH , γH) ≥ σM1 (0, γL|γH , γH) ≥ σM1 (0, γH |γH , γH) > 0, which im-
plies that the misaligned analyst’s utility if she keeps precision γL (fixing the investor’s
postulated equilibrium strategy) can again be calculated by treating σM1 (1, γL|γH , γH) =
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σM1 (0, γL|γH , γH) = 1. As a result, the misaligned analyst has no incentive to increase her
precision because the benefit of doing so is zero. Thus there do not exist equilibria in which
both analysts acquire information.
(iii) Suppose in the postulated equilibria, only the aligned analyst acquires information
and communication in each period is informative. Then by Claim 1, for γH → 1 and
xA ∈ (0, xA(λ, γH , γL, xM)] ∪ [xM ,∞), in any first period informative communication,
it has to be true that σA1 (s1, γH |γH , γL) = s1 and σM1 (1, γH |γH , γL) = 1. Therefore, for
xM < xM(λ, γH , γL), the unique first period informative communication is such that both
analysts report their signals truthfully. Then the misaligned analyst’s benefit from acquiring
information (by the proof of Proposition 2) is
∆M = ∆ ≥ co.
Hence for c < co, the misaligned analyst has incentive to increase her precision, which
upsets the postulated equilibria.
A.7 Proof of Corollary 2
According to Proposition 3, if xM = xA < xM(λ, γH , γL) and γH → 1, then for c < co,
the first period communication is babbling. In addition, given xM = xA = x, γH → 1 and




the same time, according to the proof of Proposition 2, for c = ∆ + ε > co, both types of
analysts tell the truth in the first period.
(1) Social welfare of having c = c2 = ∆ + ε > co for x < xM(λ, γH , γL).
In this case, the equilibrium is such that only the aligned analyst acquires information,
both types of analysts tell the truth in the first period, and in the second period, the aligned
analyst tells the truth and misaligned analyst always reports 1.
Given this equilibrium, social welfare is calculated. To that end, I first calculate the
investor’s expected utility for the second period (with posterior analyst reputation λ2):
V I(λ2) = −Pr(w2 = 1,m2 = 1)[a2(1, λ2, γH)− 1]2 − Pr(w2 = 1,m2 = 0)[a2(0, λ2, γH)− 1]2
−Pr(w2 = 0,m2 = 1)[a2(1, λ2, γH)− 0]2 − Pr(w2 = 0,m2 = 0)[a2(0, λ2, γH)− 0]2
= −1
2
(γHλ2 + 1− λ2)[a2(1, λ2, γH)− 1]2 − 1
2
(1− γH)λ2[a2(0, λ2, γH)− 1]2
−1
2
((1− γH)λ2 + 1− λ2)[a2(1, λ2, γH)− 0]2 − 1
2
γHλ2[a2(0, λ2, γH)− 0]2
= −1− [1 + 2(γH − 1)γH ]λ2
2(2− λ2).
It’s easy to show that V I(λ2) is increasing and convex in λ2.
Note that in this equilibrium, both types of analysts truthfully report their signals in
the first period. This amounts to that the investor observes the signal himself in the first
period with (average) precision λγH + (1 − λ)γL. Hence a1(1) = λγH + (1 − λ)γL and





















[λγH + (1− λ)γL][−x(a1(0)− 0)2 + (1− x)V I(Λ(0, 0))]
}
= −xa1(1)a1(0) + (1− x)
{
(1− λ)(1− γL)V I(0) + (λ+ (1− λ)γL)V I( λ
λ+ (1− λ)γL )
}
.
The aligned analyst’s expected utility is 4:
lim
γH→1
EUA(c = c2) =
1
2




[−x(a1(0)− 0)2 + (1− x)V A(Λ(0, 0))]− c2
= −x
2
[(a1(1)− 1)2 + a1(0)2] + (1− x)V A( λ
λ+ (1− λ)γL )− c2
= −xa1(0)2 + (1− x)V A( λ
λ+ (1− λ)γL )− c2.
The misaligned analyst’s expected utility is:
lim
γH→1




2] + (1− x){γLV M( λ




4Here, I suppress dependence of V J(·) on the aligned analyst’s equilibrium precision.
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Adding the players’ utilities, social welfare of having c = c2 equals:
W (c = c2) = EU
I(c = c2) + λEU
A(c = c2) + (1− λ)EUM(c = c2).
(2) Social welfare of having c = c1 < co for x < xM(λ, γH , γL).
According to Proposition 3, in this case, the first period communication is babbling.
Based on this equilibrium, the investor’s ex ante expected utility is calculated analogously:
EU I(c = c1) = −x
4
+ (1− x)V I(λ).
The aligned analyst’s expected utility is:
EUA(c = c1) = −x
4
+ (1− x)V A(λ)− c1.
The misaligned analyst’s expected utility is:
EUM(c = c1) = −x
4
+ (1− x)V M(λ).
Adding up all players’ utilities, social welfare of having c = c1 is
W (c = c1) = EU
I(c = c1) + λEU
A(c = c1) + (1− λ)EUM(c = c1).
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− a1(1)a1(0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
first period, > 0
+ (1− x)[(1− λ)(1− γL)V I(0) + (λ+ (1− λ)γL)V I( λ
λ+ (1− λ)γL )− V
I(λ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
second period, > 0
.
The fact that the first period difference is greater than 0 comes directly from a1(1)+a1(0) =
1; and the second period difference being greater than 0 is due to the convexity of V I .
For the aligned analyst,
lim
γH→1




− a1(0)2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
first period, > 0
+ (1− x)[V A( λ
λ+ (1− λ)γL )− V
A(λ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
second period, > 0
− (c2 − c1).︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost difference,→ 0
For the misaligned analyst,
lim
γH→1










2[(4− 3λ)λ+ 4γL(1− λ)(3− 2λ)]
4(2− λ)2(2γL(1− λ) + λ)2︸ ︷︷ ︸






[W (c = c2)−W (c = c1)] = 1
2
xλ(a1(1)− a1(0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
first period, > 0
− λ(c2 − c1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost difference,→ 0
.
Thus, social welfare increases when information-gathering costs increase from c1 to c2.
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Appendix B
Proofs for Chapter 2
B.1 Preliminaries.
We follow the procedure in Crawford and Sobel (1982). The prior variance of p given that
p is uniformly distributed over [0, P ] is σ2P = P
2/12. As mentioned in the text, we focus
on the most informative equilibrium, i.e., the one with the finest partitioning. The expected
information loss regarding the random variable a ∼ U [0, A], conditional on a cheap talk
report made by a privately informed party equals (we suppress the argument b whenever

























where 〈t〉 denotes the smallest integer greater or equal to t. The number of partitions,
N(A, b), jumps from n + 1 to n at b = bn(A) ≡ 2A(2n+1)2−1 . In particular, there will be no
information conveyed (N(·) = 1) if and only if b > b1(A) = A/4. Lastly, σ2P is computed
analogously.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 3.
Simple algebra establishes the profit differential between delegation and centralization,
piD(x, b)− piC(x, b) = (1− qa(x))Z(x, b), as stated in (2.8), where1
Z(x, b) ≡ σ2A − [b2 + qp(x)σ2P ].
Consider first the case of small CEO biases. Following the arguments in Dessein












































That is, when b tends to 0, delegation converges to first-best faster than centralization. So
when b is sufficiently small, delegation dominates centralization for all x ∈ [0, 1].




, b2 ≥ A2
12
≥ σ2A. Then
Z(·) = σ2A − b2 − qp(x)σ2P < 0 for any x, i.e., centralization dominates delegation for all
x ∈ [0, 1].
Lastly, if b is in the intermediate region, define xˆ(b) by Z(xˆ(b), b) = 0. Because qp(·) is
decreasing in x, Z(·) is increasing in x. As a result, when x > xˆ(b), Z(x, b) > Z(xˆ(b), b) =
0, which implies that shareholders prefer delegation, and vice versa.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 4.










− q′a(xC)Z(xC , b)− (1− qa(xC))q′p(xC)σ2P












= −q′a(xC)Z(xC , b)− (1− qa(xC))q′p(xC)σ2P




> 0. Recall that
piD(x, b) is concave in x, then xD(b) > xC(b) is immediate.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 5.


















2 +B(x)σ2P , (B.3)
where
B(x) ≡ q′a(x)qp(x)− (1− qa(x))q′p(x) > 0.
The assumptions stated in the lemma ensure interior solutions for both regimes for any
b > 0. The optimal interior solutions xC(b) and xD(b), respectively, are obtained by setting
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= −q′a(xC)σ2A + q′a(xC)b2 +B(xC)σ2P









= −σ2{q′a(xC)(1− qp(xC)) + (1− qa(xC))q′p(xC)}+ q′a(xC)b2.
Let
h(x) ≡ q′a(x)(1− qp(x)) + (1− qa(x))q′p(x).
Given the exponential technology assumed in the lemma:
h(x) = ηz(1− x)z−1xz−1[(1− x)1−z − x1−z − η(1− 2x)].
Let w(x) ≡ (1− x)1−z − x1−z − η(1− 2x). Then, limη→1w(0) = limη→1(1− η) = 0 and
w(1
2
) = 0. Moreover, w′′(x) = (1 − z)z(x−z−1 − (1 − x)−z−1) ≥ 0 for x ∈ [0, 1/2], i.e.,
w(x) is a convex function for x ∈ [0, 1/2]. Therefore, by Jensen’s inequality, w(x) ≤ 0 for
x ∈ [0, 1/2]. Hence h(x) ≤ 0 for x ∈ [0, 1/2].
Next, we show that xC(b) ∈ (0, 1/2], where (the interior) xC(b) is again obtained by
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setting (B.2) equal to zero. If b > A/4 and A = P , σ2A = σ
2




C) = 0, which, given the assumed exponential technology, implies













Then, by global concavity of piD(x, b), we have xD(b) > xC(b).
B.5 Proof of Proposition 4.
This proof provides the solution to the shareholders’s optimization program P0.
Part (i). For b sufficiently small, Lemma 3 shows that piD(x, b) > piC(x, b) for any
x. Then, piD(xD(b), b) ≥ piD(xC(b), b) > piC(xC(b), b). The first inequality is by revealed
preference and the second inequality follows from piD(x, b) > piC(x, b) for any x. Hence,
for b sufficiently small, the shareholders chooses delegation.
Part (ii). The proof follows analogously as in part (i).
Part (iii). The preceding parts show that piD(xD(b), b)− piC(xC(b), b) > 0 for b small
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and piD(xD(b), b) − piC(xC(b), b) < 0 for b large. Then by continuity, there must exist at
least one bˆ such that piD(xD(bˆ), bˆ)− piC(xC(bˆ), bˆ) = 0.
We now show that xC(bˆ) < xˆ(bˆ) < xD(bˆ). We proceed in two steps: we first show that
this chain of inequalities holds in weak form, and then rule out equality. First, suppose that
xC(bˆ) > xˆ(bˆ). By Lemma 3, then
piD(xC(bˆ), bˆ) > piC(xC(bˆ), bˆ).
Yet, by definition of bˆ, piD(xD(bˆ), bˆ) ≡ piC(xC(bˆ), bˆ). Thus, piD(xC(bˆ), bˆ) > piD(xD(bˆ), bˆ),
which contradicts the optimality of xD(·). As a result, xC(bˆ) ≤ xˆ(bˆ). A similar argument
shows that xˆ(bˆ) ≤ xD(bˆ). Therefore, xC(bˆ) ≤ xˆ(bˆ) ≤ xD(bˆ).
Now, we show that the preceding chain of inequalities holds in a strict sense. Suppose
that xD(bˆ) = xC(bˆ) ≡ x¯. Then it must also be true that xˆ(bˆ) = x¯. Then, by virtue of






piD(x¯, bˆ) = 0
143




















⇐⇒ (1− qa(x¯))q′p(x¯) = 0,
which contradicts our maintained assumption that qj(x) < 1 and q′j(x) 6= 0 for any x
and j = a, p. Thus, xD(bˆ) > xC(bˆ). Using a simple geometrical argument shows that
xˆ(bˆ) ∈ (xC(bˆ), xD(bˆ)) must then hold.
Hence, at the cutoff bˆwhere the optimal organization structure switches from delegation
to centralization, x∗(b) jumps down from xD(bˆ) to xC(bˆ). Other than at such discontinu-
ities, x∗(b) is increasing in b, by Lemma 6.
B.6 Proof of Proposition 5.
We now solve the CEO’s program P1 and compare its solution, denoted by xCEO(b), with
that of the benchmark program P0, denoted by x∗(b).
The CEO’s program P1 can be decomposed as follows. First, find the CEO’s optimal
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payoff piS∗CEO(b) for given mode S = C,D:
max
x
piDCEO(x, b), s.t. x > xˆ(b), (B.4)
max
x
piCCEO(x, b), s.t. x ≤ xˆ(b). (B.5)
In a second step, compare piD∗CEO(b) and pi
C∗
CEO(b) and select the larger one.
Denote by xD∗CEO(b) and x
C∗
CEO(b), respectively, the solutions to the constrained max-
imization problems (B.4) and (B.5). Analogously, denote by xDCEO(b) and x
C
CEO(b), re-
spectively, the solutions to the corresponding unconstrained maximization problems. It is
immediate that xCCEO(b) = x
C(b), because under centralization the CEO’s preference over
the board composition coincides with that of the shareholders (Lemma 0).
Part (i): b < bˆ. First, we show that xˆ(b) < xD(b) for b < bˆ. Suppose on the contrary
that xˆ(b) ≥ xD(b). Then,
piC(xC(b), b) ≥ piC(xD(b), b) ≥ piD(xD(b), b).
The first inequality follows by revealed preference and the second inequality follows from
xˆ(b) ≥ xD(b) together with Lemma 3. However, by the definition of bˆ and the regularity
condition that bˆ is unique (footnote 19), piD(xD(b), b) > piC(xC(b), b) for b < bˆ — a
contradiction. Thus, xˆ(b) < xD(b) for b < bˆ.










CEO(b) ≥ piDCEO(xD(b), b)− piCCEO(xCCEO(b), b)
= piDCEO(x
D(b), b)− piCCEO(xC(b), b) (by xCCEO(b) = xC(b))
= piD(xD(b), b) + [1− 2qa(xD(b))]b2 − piC(xC(b), b) + b2 (by (2.7))
= piD(xD(b), b)− piC(xC(b), b) + 2[1− qa(xD(b))]b2
> 0 (since piD(xD(b), b) > piC(xC(b), b) when b < bˆ)
Hence, when b < bˆ, the CEO will choose xCEO(b) = xD
∗
CEO(b), followed by the board
choosing S∗(xCEO(b)) = D.
Next, we show that xD∗CEO(b) < x


















The last inequality holds by global concavity of piD(x, b) and optimality of xD(b). There-
fore, xˆ(b) ≤ xD∗CEO(b) < xD(b). (Recall that xˆ(b) < xD(b) when b < bˆ.)
Part (ii): b is sufficiently large. In this case, centralization dominates delegation for all
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x (by Lemma 3). Then, manipulating x to obtain delegation is not feasible for CEO. By
Lemma 0, then, the CEO will choose xCEO(b) = xC(b).
Part (iii): bˆ ≤ b ≤ bˆ+ε, where ε→ 0. Proposition 4 shows that xC(b) < xˆ(b) < xD(b)
at b = bˆ. By continuity, xC(b) < xˆ(b) < xD(b) holds also for bˆ ≤ b ≤ bˆ + ε. Then the
same revealed preference arguments as in part (i) show that piD∗CEO(b) ≥ piDCEO(xD(b), b)





CEO(b) ≥ piDCEO(xD(b), b)− piCCEO(xCCEO(b), b)
= piDCEO(x
D(b), b)− piCCEO(xC(b), b)
= piD(xD(b), b)− piC(xC(b), b) + 2[1− qa(xD(b))]b2
Clearly, when ε→ 0, [piD(xD(b), b)− piC(xC(b), b)]→ 0, and therefore
piD
∗
CEO(b)− piC∗CEO(b) > 0 because qa(xD(b)) < 1.
So, if b is “slightly above” bˆ, CEO will choose xCEO(b) = xD
∗
CEO(b) ≥ xˆ(b) > xC(b)
followed by the board choosing S∗(xCEO(b)) = D.
B.7 Proof of Lemma 7
Part (i). In the proof of Proposition 5 part (i), we show that xˆ(b) < xD(b) for b < bˆ. Adding
back the suppressed argument A, it is immediate that for b < bˆ(A¯), xˆ(A¯, b) < xD(b). (Note
that xD(·) is independent ofA.) That is, Constraint (D) is always slack for b ∈ [bˆ(A), bˆ(A¯)].
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Part (ii). To prove that for A¯ sufficiently small, constraint (C) in program PC will
be slack for b ∈ [bˆ(A), bˆ(A¯)], we first show that xˆ(A, b) ≥ xC(A, b) for any b ≥ bˆ(A).
Suppose not and instead xˆ(A, b) < xC(A, b). Then, by Lemma 3, piD(xC(A, b), b) >
piC(xC(A, b), A, b). By Proposition 4, piC(xC(A, b), A, b) ≥ piD(xD(b), b) for any b ≥
bˆ(A). Therefore, piD(xC(A, b), b) > piD(xD(b), b), which contradicts the optimality of
xD(b). As a result, xˆ(A, b) ≥ xC(A, b) for any b ≥ bˆ(A). Therefore limA¯→A xˆ(A¯, b) =
xˆ(A, b) ≥ xC(A, b) for any b ≥ bˆ(A), i.e., for A¯ sufficiently small, constraint (C) in
program PC is slack for any b ≥ bˆ(A).
On the other hand, if A¯ > A˜(xC(A, bˆ(A)), bˆ(A)), which is equivalent to xC(A, bˆ(A)) >
xˆ(A¯, bˆ(A)), constraint (C) will be binding at bˆ(A). At the same time,
xC(A, bˆ(A¯)) < xC(A¯, bˆ(A¯)), since ∂xC/∂A > 0
< xˆ(A¯, bˆ(A¯))), by Proposition 4
Then by continuity of xC(·) and xˆ(·), there must exist at least one bC ∈ (bˆ(A), bˆ(A¯)) such
that xC(A, bC) = xˆ(A¯, bC).
B.8 Proof of Proposition 6
As shown in Lemma 7, part (ii), when A¯ > A˜(xC(A, bˆ(A)), bˆ(A)), constraint (C) will be
binding at bˆ(A) and there must exist at least one bC ∈ [bˆ(A), bˆ(A¯)] such that xC(A, bC) =
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xˆ(A¯, bC). If there exist multiple thresholds bC , we focus on the smallest one. Denote by
VC(·) as the value of program PC and by VD(·) the value of program PD.
Part (i). [Acquiesce] Since constraint (C) is binding at bˆ(A), then by continuity, con-
straint (C) is also binding at bˆ(A)+δ, where δ → 0. Hence VC(bˆ(A)+δ) < piC(xC(A, bˆ(A)+
δ), A, bˆ(A) + δ) due to the shadow cost of (C). On the other hand, VD(·) = piD(xD(b), b)
since constraint (D) is always slack, by Lemma 7. Therefore:
lim
δ→0
VC(bˆ(A) + δ) < lim
δ→0
piC(xC(A, bˆ(A) + δ), A, bˆ(A) + δ)
= lim
δ→0




Hence for b “slightly above” bˆ(A), shareholders prefer to acquiesce to CEO entrenchment
and choose x = xD(b). In response, the CEO will choose A = A˜(xD(b), b) + ε to noise up
the project complexity by just enough so as to ensure delegation.
Part (ii). [Preempt at a cost] At the threshold bC , constraint (C) is just binding, there-
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C − δ) = VC(bC) = piC(xC(A, bC), A, bC)
> piD(xD(bC), bC), since bC > bˆ(A)
= lim
δ→0





Hence for b = bC − δ, the constraint (C) is still binding, yet the shareholders are better off
choosing x = xˆ(A¯, b) to preempt CEO entrenchment. In response, the CEO will choose
A = A.
Part (iii). [Preempt at no cost] For b = bC + δ, similarly as part (ii), we can show that
limδ→0 VC(bC + δ) > limδ→0 VD(bC + δ). Hence for b slightly above bC , constraint (C)
becomes slack, the shareholders will choose x = xC(A, b) to preempt CEO entrenchment.
In response, the CEO will choose A = A.
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